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I. INTRODUCTION
In the months preceding the financial collapse in 2008, most indi-
viduals in this country were oblivious to the looming problem about to
envelop the country. How did the default of a few sub-prime loans
mushroom into one of the most severe financial crises to ever face the
nation? Answers may be found in dozens of post-collapse books, and,
while opinions may differ as to the primary cause, most will maintain
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that several developments played a role with inadequate risk manage-
ment being a major factor. In the Treasury Department's proposal to
Congress for regulatory reform, the problem was summed up simply as:
"No regulator saw its job as protecting the economy and financial sys-
tem as a whole."' Subsequently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank" or "the Act") was enacted
with the intent to fill the gaps and create coordinated regulatory over-
sight to avert risks before the broader economy became endangered.2
Nevertheless, there is a growing risk, for which there is no coordinated
regulatory oversight that could damage the nation's economic well-
being. That risk is a mature foreclosure crisis that continues to escalate.
New problems are appearing, and there is no risk management for the
nation's highly fragmented foreclosure system. The foreclosure system
of each state can be affected by individual actions taken by the countless
state, county, municipal, and judicial officers. No two states in the coun-
try have the same foreclosure laws, which, in some instances, date back
to the seventeenth century.
There are a growing number of situations where the isolated action
of an individual officer, such as a local judge, causes significant delays
in the completion of foreclosures. But, delays are just one problem.
There are instances where such action affects substantive rights in collat-
eral, which, in turn, trigger bandwagon responses. It is estimated that, at
the current rate, it will take over sixty years to complete the now-pend-
ing foreclosure actions in the state of New York (the delays likely trig-
gered by a single judge from Long Island).3 In addition to the current
foreclosures, economists estimate that in the next several years there
may be another seven million homes that will face foreclosure.4 The
slowdown in the foreclosure process due to legal and political wrangling
is causing an increase in the actual number of homeowners who decide
to strategically default and walk away from their homes.5
As of June 2011, the total residential mortgage debt in the U.S. was
1. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 2
(2009) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM] (emphasis
added), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
3. David Streitfeld, Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/business/19foreclosure.html?pagewanted=l
[hereinafter Streifeld, Backlog].
4. Laurie S. Goodman, Dimensioning the Housing Crisis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May/June 2010,
at 26, 26 available at http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.2469/faj.v66.n3.6.
5. See Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing
and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis 2-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working
Paper No. 11-26, 2011), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/
publications/working-papers/201 l/wpl 1-26.pdf; Shuang Zhu & R. Kelley Pace, The Influence of
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$10.3 trillion.6 Of that amount, $5.1 trillion is insured or guaranteed by a
government-sponsored enterprise or federal agency.7 The United States
Federal Reserve currently holds approximately $1.1 trillion of the
agency's mortgage-backed securities ("MBSs"),8 which were purchased
as part of the financial crisis rescue. The Federal Reserve Bank of New
York also owns $26 billion in private-label MBSs in its Maiden Lane
special purpose entities as part of the American International Group
("AIG") bailout.9 The dominant role assumed by the federal government
in the mortgage financing market has exposed the American taxpayer to
the real potential of massive monetary losses.' ° Thus, the protection of
the overwhelming federal interest in the collateral associated with these
obligations is of vital importance.
The federal government has many intertwined roles in the current
crisis: the regulator of virtually every participant in U.S. financial mar-
kets, receiver of failed financial institutions,"I guarantor of most home
mortgages,1 2 creditor of financial institutions,' 3 and owner of securities
backed by home mortgages.' 4 These responsibilities arose as a conse-
quence of the sovereign functions of the federal government.' 5 The
Foreclosure Delays on Borrower's Default Behavior 3 (Apr. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1717127.




9. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 17 n.51 (2011) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FINAL
REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-I 12shrg64832/pdf/CHRG- 112shrg6
4832.pdf; see also American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane 1! and III, BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys. (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
reformaig.htm.
10. See, e.g., MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22950, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP 1 (2008) (no words were minced in explaining the consequence of
conservatorship: "the U.S. taxpayer now stands behind about $5 trillion of GSE debt"), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/ documents/organization/I 10097.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing on
Examining Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure and the Impact
These Problems Have Had on U.S. Homeowners and the Housing Market During the Economic
Downturn Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, I 11th Cong. 284 (2010)
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spdecOllO.html; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-18.
12. See LENDER PROCESSING SERVS., LPS MORTGAGE MONITOR: OCTOBER 2011 MORTGAGE
PEROFROMANCE OPERATIONS 5 (2011), available at http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporate
Information/CommunicationCenter/DataReports/MortgageMonitor/201109MortgageMonitor/LPS
MortgageMonitorSeptember20 11.pdf (over 75% of all active loans are backed by the
government).
13. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 15-25.
14. Id.
15. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) ("We hold that
2012]
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inability to help homeowners or curtail the foreclosure crisis, despite the
expenditure of hundreds of billions in federal dollars, is due, in part, to
the disparate regulation of the foreclosure process by each state. Further-
more, coordinated regulation of mortgage financing, servicing, default,
and foreclosure is required to effectively protect consumers and enhance
the competitiveness and stability of U.S. financial markets. Collectively,
the increasing intervention by state actors in the foreclosure process may
pose a serious risk to the nation's economy as a whole. The country does
not want to look back and say again: "No regulator saw its job as pro-
tecting the economy and financial system as a whole."16
Because of the need to protect these vital federal interests, this arti-
cle urges Congress to enact legislation adopting a national, uniform, and
non-judicial foreclosure process for all federally related mortgages.'1
The Act should explicitly preempt state foreclosure law and be applied
retroactively to any federally related mortgage. I will address several
reasons why a federal uniform foreclosure law is needed as well as the
constitutional basis for the preemption of state law and retroactive appli-
cation of the new federal law. This article proposes the general structure
of the new federal law and offers suggestions for the disposition of fore-
closed housing inventory.
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 HAD ITS ORIGINS
IN THE HOUSING MARKET
"[D]ecades ago, Congressional charters set up Fannie Mae [Federal
National Mortgage Association] and Freddie Mac [Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation] as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-
privately owned financial institutions established by the government to
fulfill a public mission."'1 8 The two GSEs were created to provide stabil-
ity to the secondary residential mortgage market and to promote access
to mortgage credit and home ownership. 19 To accomplish these goals,
where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the
directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First
Amendment.").
16. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFoRM, supra note 1, at 4
(emphasis added).
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (2006) (defining "federally related mortgage loan"); 12 C.F.R.
§ 590.2 (2012) (defining "Federally-related loans"); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.2 (2012) (defining
"Federally related mortgage loan").
18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4021, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL
ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET viii (2010) [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
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GSEs engage in two lines of business. The first is a credit guarantee
business, whereby Freddie and Fannie guarantee the timely payment of
principal and interest on MBSs.2° In the second line, Fannie and Freddie
manage retained portfolios containing mortgages and MBSs (each
other's and those issued by private companies).2 1 Funding for portfolio
holdings is provided by issuance of debt obligations which are, in turn,
sold to investors.22
U.S. house prices began to rise above historical values in the late
1990s. 23 Analysts attribute the rapid growth in the demand for homes
and the associated rise in housing prices to unusually low interest rates,
large capital inflows, rapid income growth, and innovations in the mort-
gage market. 24 In 1999, Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which
resulted in significant deregulation of the Wall Street financial services
industry.25 Around that time, the GSE's credit guarantees provided mort-
gages borrowers with more credit availability and lower interest rates.2 6
There was a rapid rise in nonprime loans that originating lenders sold
into the secondary market.2 7 As a result, the home-lending industry
changed from an originate-to-own to an originate-to-sell business
model.28 Mortgage originators obtained mortgage guarantees from GSEs
or other private insurers and started selling them to third parties. Lenders
were incentivized to sell the mortgages because they could make a quick
profit, refinance existing or purchase new mortgages, and distribute the
risk of default to others.29
Until 2008, the GSEs' debt securities and MBSs were not officially
backed by the federal government. 30  Nevertheless, most investors
believed that the government would not allow Fannie and Freddie to
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See CARL LEVIN & TOM COBURN, S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 7, 41, 65-66 (2011),
available at http://hsgac. senate.gov/ public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.
24. Id. at 41.
25. See id. at 15-16. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 repealed provisions of the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had generally required banks, investment banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies to operate separately, and instead allowed them to openly merge
operations. Id. It also eliminated the Glass-Steagall prohibition on banks engaging in proprietary
trading and exempted investment bank holding companies from direct federal regulation. Id. Some
have said the repeal created conflict of interest within the financial industry and fostered "too big
to fail" by allowing banks to become too large, complex, and intertwined which led to the
financial crisis. Id. at 16.
26. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 18, at viii.
27. See LEVIN & COBURN, supra note 23, at 18-19.
28. See id. at 17-21 (explaining lenders' advantages in selling loans).
29. See id. at 20-21.
30. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 18, at viii.
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default on their obligations." That perception of an implicit federal
guarantee stemmed from the specific benefits, such as being exempt
from corporate income taxes and having a line of credit with the Trea-
sury, which the two entities received because of their status as GSEs.32
When homeowners began to default en masse, securitized debt instru-
ments were negatively impacted.33 The ratings agencies downgraded
MBSs, and the market for these debt instruments collapsed.
34
In September 2008, a growing threat to the solvency of the GSEs
was creating uncertainty in the broader financial markets.35 In response,
the federal government created the Federal Housing Finance Agency
("FHFA"), which assumed control of the two GSEs by placing them in
conservatorship.36 "[T]he Treasury bought just over $220 billion of the
two entities' MBSs" and provided an unlimited guarantee of their obli-
gations through 2012.11 In addition, the Federal Reserve supported Fan-
nie and Freddie by purchasing $1.25 trillion of their portfolio MBSs and
more than $175 billion of their debt.38 ] The aid and the explicit federal
guarantee allowed Fannie and Freddie to continue operating even
though many financial institutions in the private sector were failing or
withdrawing from the market.39 "Consequently, in 2009, the two GSEs
owned or guaranteed roughly half of all outstanding mortgages in the
United States (including a significant share of subprime mortgages), and
they financed three-quarters of new mortgages originated that year."4 °
Unfortunately, rather than winding down the GSEs operations, "more
than 90 percent of new mortgages made in 2009 carried a federal
guarantee.'
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in response to the crisis.
Section 1491(a)(9) of the Act details the consequence of the takeover of
the GSEs: "The conservatorship for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has
potentially exposed taxpayers to upwards of $5,300,000,000,000 worth
of risk."' 42 With trillions of dollars at stake and with federal tax dollars
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id.
33. Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners and Bondholders as Unlikely Allies: Allocating the
Costs of Securitization in Foreclosure, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., May 2011, at 19, 21.
34. Id.
35. See CONG. BUDGET OFI'CE, FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 18, at 1.
36. Id. at 3; JICKLING, supra note 10, at 1.
37. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 18, at 9-10.
38. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 17-18.
39. CONG. BUDGET OFICE, FEDERAL ROLE, supra note 18, at viii.
40. Id. at viii-ix.
41. Id. at ix.
42. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1491(a)(9), 124 Stat. 1376, 2206 (2010). What is
also troubling is that the taxpayer liability resulting from GSEs' guarantees is not included as part
of the federal budget nor considered under federal debt ceiling limitations. See CONG. BUDGET
[Vol. 67:41
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guaranteeing over 90% of all new mortgages being made, there is an
overwhelming federal interest in a foreclosure process that protects that
interest and minimizes systemic risk.
IIL. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSING MARKET
Several factors are hindering the housing recovery.43 First, in June
2011, 10.9 million U.S. homes had a mortgage that was "underwater"-
what the borrower owed exceeded the market value of the property-
and some homeowners were deeply "underwater."'  By some estimates,
there were 2.4 million borrowers at "near-negative equity"--defined as
borrowers having less than five percent equity in the homes; "[tiogether,
negative equity and near-negative equity mortgages accounted for 27.5
percent of all residential properties with a mortgage nationwide. 4a Sec-
ond, millions of houses are in foreclosure, and a number of obstacles
have delayed their resolution. 46 Third, many financial institutions have
tightened lending standards that precludes the refinancing of existing
mortgages. 47 The loan losses and increased uncertainty that accompa-
nied the housing collapse also slowed the economy.48 Unemployment
rates rose to 10.2% and still remain at over 8%. 49 The numerous pro-
grams implemented to avoid foreclosures have produced neither stabi-
lized home prices nor relief for troubled homeowners; the pressure
exerted by oversupply cannot be overcome. The buildup of distressed
supply has only grown over time. Lenders who are willing to underwrite
OFFICE, PUB. No. 4023, CBO's BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 3
(2010) [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY TREATMENT], available at http://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files /cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doclO878/01-13-fanniefreddie.pdf.
43. For a comprehensive analysis of the housing market, see generally JOINT CTR. FOR Hous.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNiv., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2011 (2011), available at
http://www.jchs. harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2Ol1 .pdf. See also generally A. Gary
Shilling, Still Home Sick, INSIGHT, May 2011 (discussing housing and identifying excess
inventories as the primary culprit contributing to housing weakness).
44. Press Release, CoreLogic, New CoreLogic Data Reveals Q2 Negative Equity Declines in
Hardest Hit Markets and 8 Million Negative Equity Borrowers Have Above Market Rates (Sept.
13, 2011), available at http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/asset-upload-file75_12141.pdf.
45. Id.
46. See JoINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 43, at 4.
47. See Danielle DiMartino Booth & David Luttrell, The Fallacy of a Pain-Free Path to a
Healthy Housing Market, ECON. LETTER: INSIGHTs FROM THE FED. RES. BANK DALL., Dec. 2010,
at 1, 2 available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/eclett/20l 0/el l01 4.pdf.
48. See generally John V. Duca, John Muellbauer & Anthony Murphy, Housing Markets and
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Lessons for the Future, 6 J. FIN. STABILITY 203 (2010),
available at http://www. sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S 1572308910000343 (follow "PDF
(771 K)" hyperlink).
49. See Press Release, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Nat'l Unemployment Update:
Unemployment Drops to 8.1 Percent in August 2012 (Sept. 7, 2012), aivailable at http://www.
ncsl.org/ issues-research/labor/national-employment-monthly-update.aspx.
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new mortgages are unable to determine the underlying value of the
collateral.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, provided an
analysis as to why the U.S. recovery after the 2008 crisis has been so
weak. 0 He discussed the role of "uncertainty" and how it has created an
aversion to fixed or long-term investing, such as housing, which has
hampered economic recovery.5 He described how government interven-
tion to support housing prices has delayed the liquidation required to
restore balance to the market. 2 Further, he explained that for speculators
to be effective in stabilizing markets, they have to believe that they are
able to judge oversold markets. 3 Greenspan also note that "unpredict-
able . . . government intervention[s]" thwart speculative activity that
would "add support to a market when it is weakest" and buying is riski-
est.54 He explained that the "mere uncertainty" of possible intervention
causes speculators to remain on the "sidelines."55
Many foreclosures are warranted and need to occur to clear the
market of economic inefficiencies. Most programs initiated to prevent
foreclosures seem to ignore the difference between home affordability
and loss of homeownership equity. The government strategies are
designed, in part, to support home prices.5 6 However, without price-sup-
ports provided through federal programs, there would be market correc-
tion and lower home prices, thereby creating a large inventory of
affordable homes available to rent or purchase. 7 Market corrections are
painful; but loss of equity, in and of itself, should not be the single sub-
ject debated by policymakers.58 All costs and benefits need to be consid-
50. See Alan Greenspan, Commentary, Activism, 14 II, T'L FIN. 165 (2011), available at http://
onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doil10.1111/j.1468-2362.2011.01277.x/pdf (analyzing the housing
market's slow recovery).
51. See generally id.
52. See id. at178.
53. See id. at 179.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34653, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 13 (2008), [hereinafter MURPHY,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS], available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/l10095.pdf.
57. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Ruins of an American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at
BU1 (describing a family that abandoned a house and $3,400 monthly mortgage payment to
foreclosure and began renting a brand new house two miles away for $1,200 per month).
58. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage
Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FoRDH"A L. REv. 949, 985 (2008)
("The mortgage crisis has not generally been viewed as likely to lead to a rash of homelessness-
rather, it has raised the specter of people losing homes they purchased. In other words, most who
are concerned about the mortgage foreclosure debacle recognizes that homeowner status is at
issue.").
[Vol. 67:41
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ered in the mix of strategy.5 9
For example, a recent economic study found "fairly surprising"
results as to what happens to households after they experience a foreclo-
sure. 6 Contrary to concerns urged by policy makers, the results indi-
cated that housing consumption does not decrease. The study found that
most post-foreclosure households will maintain their sizes and composi-
tions, live in single-family structures of similar size and quality, and
relocate in neighborhoods with characteristics very similar to their old
neighborhoods. 61 "No perfect solution to the housing crisis exists."62
The continuing price declines will undoubtedly cause more economic
disruption. Despite years of intervention through numerous programs,
uncertainty in the housing market is still prevalent and continues to ham-
per economic recovery. Given that time has not proven beneficial in any
material way in stabilizing housing prices, allowing the market to clear
may now be the better policy choice.
IV. IMPACT OF STATE FORECLOsuRE LAW ON THE RETURN OF
PRIVATE CAPITAL TO THE MARKET
Dodd-Frank was enacted in the wake of the crisis to enhance the
integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial
markets.6 3 The Act was the "largest single legislative overhaul of the
financial services industry since the 1930s. '64 One key objective of the
Act was to provide the tools needed to adapt to changes in the financial
market and to effectively manage financial crises.65 The Act has provi-
sions that regulate how loans are obtained, maintained, securitized, and
59. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of
Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REv. 573, 596 (2009) ("[H]omeownership sometimes brings
dependence and loss of wealth rather than the expected independence and increased wealth.").
60. Raven Molloy & Hui Shan, The Post-Foreclosure Experience of U.S. Households 24-25
(Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2011-32, 2011), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/Pubs/ FEDS/2011/201132/201132pap.pdf.
61. Id. at 25. But see KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40210, PRESERVING
HOMEOWNERSHIP: FORECLOSURE PREVENTION INrIATIVES 3 (2009), available at http://www.
policyarchive.org/handle/ 10207/bitstreams/19135.pdf (speculating that families would end up in
substantially less desirable neighborhoods or more crowded living conditions or be forced to move
in with others).
62. Booth & Luttrell, supra note 47, at 3.
63. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM,
supra note 1, at 2.
64. Eric M. Hurwitz, Litigation Risk for the Residential Mortgage Industry in the Wake of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 27 THE REVmW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 (2011), http://www.
stradley.com/library/files/hurwitz_authored_1_2011 .pdf.
65. See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 1, at 2-4.
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leveraged. 66 Yet, despite its 2,300 pages, it fails to regulate and stand-
ardize how home ownership is foreclosed. The hodgepodge approach to
states' lender remedies is currently impeding the Obama Administra-
tion's ability to "effectively manage" its programs to mitigate the ongo-
ing foreclosure crisis. The antiquated patchwork of state-specific
foreclosure state laws can, and does, directly impact the motivation of
borrowers and lenders to either cooperate or not cooperate with efforts
to avoid foreclosure.
In February 2011, the Obama Administration released a report,
Reforming America's Housing Finance Market, that outlines options for
the future of housing finance.67 The goal is to "help restore trust in the
underlying foundation of the mortgage market so borrowers, lenders,
and investors have the confidence to purchase a home, issue a loan, or
make an investment. ' 68 The report recognizes the key role of the securi-
tization market in housing finance, but it concedes that private capital
has largely exited the market and has not yet returned, leaving federally-
related entities "to insure or guarantee more than nine out of every ten
new mortgages. 69 While the Obama Administration's focus is on
financing, its plan also proposes that the flaws in the "nation's broken
system of mortgage servicing and foreclosure processing" should be
addressed.7" This note suggests that one such flaw is the nation's frag-
mented foreclosure system operating under a set of non-uniform laws.
While the Uniform Commercial Code modernized the laws for
security interests in personal property, mortgage law affecting interests
in real property has never been so thoroughly overhauled. Mortgage
laws differ greatly among the states because each has attempted "to rem-
edy deficiencies in".. . the "English law inherited by the American colo-
nies."" The current foreclosure crisis proves that the uncertainty created
by the lack of standardized servicing and foreclosure laws has caused a
66. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act tit. VII §§ 711-754 (containing provisions to regulate portfolio
margining and derivatives); id. tit. IX, subtit. D, (titled "Improvements to the Asset-Backed
Securitization Process" and containing provisions for risk retention, disclosure, and due
diligence); id. tit. XIV (titled "Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act" and containing
prohibitions on loan steering, limitations on originator compensation, and standards as to a
borrower's ability to repay a loan); id. fit. XIV, subtit. E (titled "Mortgage Servicing" and
containing provisions to regulate interest changes, notice, billing, and escrow for taxes and
insurance).
67. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING
AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-2 (2011), available at http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddocid=housingfinmarketreform.pdf.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id. at 2.
71. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Providing Alternatives to
Mortgage Foreclosure: A Report to Congress 108 (March 1996).
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significant problem for the market. As the crisis continues to unfold,
state and local lawmakers and community activists increasingly
demanded some type of action. The various responses across the nation
created a shifting environment with countless regulators at the state,
county, and judicial level imposing their individual "fixes." Such a sys-
tem does not promote stability; it precludes effective management of the
current (or a future) financial crisis and will thwart the return of private
capital to the mortgage market.
There have been numerous attempts during the past century to
achieve greater uniformity in foreclosure law.72 "The basic argument for
a uniform approach ... has existed for a long time .... Money for real
estate projects comes from national and international sources unrelated
to the location of the project. Lenders who supply this money are more
likely to lend it if they can readily predict the performance of their
investment." 3 For mortgage insurers, guarantee agencies, and servicers
to participate in the secondary market, there must be "predictability of
title," economic efficiency, "fairness," and "avoidance of misunder-
standings."74 The current state foreclosure system does not meet these
needs. This is because, over the years, each state has developed its own
unique procedures, right of redemption, and right to a deficiency judg-
ment.75 In fact, the "[c]haracterization of a mortgage as either a convey-
ance of a lien or conveyance of legal title . . ." or "Deed of Trust" has
long "been a source of confusion."7 6 Any deviation from a state's articu-
lated procedures, especially with respect to due process, may threaten or
even invalidate the foreclosure sale.
At lease seventeen states require that mortgages be foreclosed only
by a judicial action.77 A judicial foreclosure involves a lengthy series of
steps: "filing of a foreclosure complaint and lis pendens notice; service
of process on all" interested parties; "a hearing"; "the decree or judg-
ment; the notice of sale; a public foreclosure sale, usually conducted by
a sheriff' or other public official; "post-sale adjudication as to the dispo-
sition of the foreclosure proceeds; and, if appropriate, the entry of a
72. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DuKE L.J. 1399, 1407-15 (2004).
73. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Symposium Article: The Future Of American Real Estate Law:
Uniform Foreclosure Laws And Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. Rev. 1109,
1110-1111 (1996).
74. Id. at 1111.
75. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 72, at 1403-06.
76. Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention In Real Estate Finance: Preemption And
Federal Common Law 71 N.C.L. REV. 293, 301-303 (1993).
77. Dan Immergluck et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial
States 4 & n.6 (Jan. 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1749609.
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deficiency judgment. In some cases, an appeal may follow. ' 78 Judicial
foreclosure is often a long and costly process. The remaining thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia utilize a non-judicial process that
tends to be shorter in duration, substantially less complicated, and less
costly than its judicial counterpart. 79 "After varying degrees of notice,
the mortgaged property is sold at a public sale by a disinterested third
party, such as a sheriff or a trustee or by the mortgagee. ' 8°
After completion of the foreclosure sale, twenty-two states provide
a "statutory redemption" period during which the mortgagor-debtor and,
in many instances, junior lien holders can "regain title after the foreclo-
sure sale by paying the foreclosure purchaser the sale price plus accrued
interest and other expenses."81 This period can be as long as a year and
may be available in both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure. 82 For a
homeowner, probably the most important disparity in foreclosure laws
among states is the personal liability of the borrower and post-foreclo-
sure deficiency judgments. In many states, a lender may foreclose on the
home first and then pursue a deficiency judgment, which is usually the
difference between the foreclosure sale price and the mortgage debt.83
Foreclosed homes seldom fetch enough to cover the outstanding loan
amount. This is because buyers may have financed up to 100% of the
value of the property during the housing boom and because today's fore-
closures take place following a four-year decline in home values. In
some states, this decline exceeds 50%.84
A few states prohibit any personal liability on purchase-money
mortgage obligations.85 In that setting, the mortgage obligation is simply
non-recourse as a matter of law.8 6 Twenty-one states use "fair market
value" legislation to limit the deficiency to the difference between the
mortgage debt and the fair value of the foreclosed real estate, rather than
78. Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of
State Mortgage Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 588 (2010) (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 3-4.
80. See Nelson, supra note 78, at 588-89.
81. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 72, at 1404 & n.21.
82. See id. at 1403-04. See also, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 729.030 (West 2012) (nonjudicial
foreclosure; three-month to one-year period of post-foreclosure redemption); IOWA CODE § 628.3
(2012) (judicial foreclosure; one-year period).
83. See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE
HOMEowNERs OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 3-4, 38-40 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/pr-reports/report-foreclosing-dream.pdf.
84. See Press Release, CoreLogic, July Home Price Index Rises 3.8 Percent Year-Over-
Year-Biggest Increase Since 2006 (September 4, 2012), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/
researchtrends/assetuploadfile84l_1 6445.pdf.
85. See id. at 5, 38-40.
86. See id.
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the difference between the debt and the foreclosure sale price.87 The
findings of a recent study substantiate that the disparity in laws among
the states creates non-competitive and unfair markets for consumers.
Researchers found that consumers in non-recourse states were approxi-
mately 30% more likely to default.88 Furthermore, for homes appraised
at $500,000 to $750,000, borrowers are more than twice as likely to
default in non-recourse states.89 Borrowers faced with a deficiency judg-
ment may find themselves at the mercy of a lender who may or may not
consider negotiation or mitigation. Or worse, banks may sell their defi-
ciency judgments to collection agencies that may relentlessly pursue a
borrower to collect the amounts still owed after foreclosure until the
statute of limitations runs (twenty years in Florida).90 Collection agen-
cies are seizing money from checking/savings accounts, garnishing
wages, and seizing other assets owned by the borrower in order to sat-
isfy the deficiency judgment, thereby prolonging the financial nightmare
for these families.91
Over the years, Fannie and Freddie have required the use of dozens
of note and mortgage forms designed to create some semblance of mort-
gage law uniformity.92 Congress has also enacted legislation on a wide
variety of substantive and procedural mortgage law issues. The state
mortgage foreclosure system places substantial roadblocks and ineffi-
ciencies in the path of a satisfactory federal resolution of the mortgage
crisis. Millions of home mortgages will have to be foreclosed in spite of
mitigation attempts. Federal interests will be served by a uniform fore-
closure process that is both efficient for the government and fair to
borrowers.
Before there can ever be a significant return of private investment
in the mortgage market, it will be crucial that the market's need for
certainty in the foreclosure process be met. Historically, capital gener-
ated by sales of MBSs to investors has resulted in the increased availa-
bility and lower cost for the residential and commercial markets. Prior to
the housing collapse, private label securitization accounted for about 50
87. Id.
88. Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default:
Evidence from U.S. States 28 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 09-10R,
2011), available at http:// aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/ghent/research/RecourseandForeclosure.
pdf.
89. Id. at 2.
90. See Doreen Hemlock, Bank Can Go After Other Assets in Florida if You Default on
Mortgage, SuN SENTINEL (Jan. 10, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.comV201 1-01-10/business/fl-
bank-mortgage-garnish -20110107_1_florida-banks-shari-olefson-collection-agency.
91. See id.
92. Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The
Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REv. 1077, 1083-87 (2007).
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to 60% of mortgage securitizations.93 Today, over 80% of mortgage
securitization is done by the GSEs.9 4 Foreign entities have often chosen
the United States to conduct their securitizations because of the relative
stability of the American economy and its legal and political system. In
contrast, the laws of other countries suppress their MBSs market
because of "the length of adjudication, the lack of trust law, [and]
problems with possession and security interests."95 For instance, in Bra-
zil, applicable laws may prevent a lender from selling foreclosed land
for up to seven years.9 6 Many of these difficulties, traditionally thought
to be problems of emerging economies, have now surfaced across the
United States.
97
The enormous capacity of land to generate capital and foster home-
ownership should not be lost. Risk, uncertainty, and costs can be mini-
mized through the use of standardized procedures governed by uniform
laws and regulations. The housing finance system is a "vital link to sus-
tainable homeownership and rental options for millions of Americans,
and it is central to our nation's economy."98 The problems and compli-
cations that have emerged in the crisis have heightened the urgency for
the changes that must occur in the regulation of finance and mortgage
law. Failure to adopt federal, uniform foreclosure laws will undercut the
integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial
markets-the very purpose of Dodd-Frank.
V. FEDERAL PROGRAMS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT DELAYING
FORECLOSURE HELPS ECONOMY
As millions of borrowers fell into foreclosure in 2008, "policymak-
ers were concerned about both the social and economic effects of mass
foreclosures and the systemic risk to the banking system caused by non-
performing mortgages." 99 At that time, an extensive body of research
indicated that a sharp rise in foreclosures would cause large drops in
93. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565, 584 (2009)
94. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, U.S. Mortgage-Related Securities Outstanding (Aug.
1, 2012), www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-US-Mortgage-
Related-SIFMA.xls.
95. See Erica W. Stump, Securitizations in Latin America, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 195,
203-204 (2000) (describing Mexican law).
96. Georgette Chapman Poindexter & Wendy Vargas-Cartaya, En Ruta Hacia El Desarrollo:
The Emerging Secondary Mortgage Market in Latin American, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 257,
262 (2002).
97. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VIII.
98. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 67,
at 31.
99. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FiNAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 68-69.
[Vol. 67:41
NO ONE SAW IT COMING-AGAIN
house prices, residential investment, and consumption of durable
goods." ° The underlying premise was that foreclosed homes have a
spill-over effect, causing a decline in value of homes in the surrounding
neighborhood."' 1 It was thought that these effects would lead to a signif-
icant decline in overall economic activity.10 2 Accordingly, if house
prices were maintained through government support, it was thought that
this outcome could be averted. 3 It was urged that foreclosure delays
were necessary to maintain price stability and restore stability to the
housing market." 4 The importance of the effect of foreclosures on real
economic activity was a key factor in policy interventions that sought to
reduce the number of foreclosures.
10 5
However, the economic rationale for those policies has been under-
mined by the recent findings of two separate studies. 0 6 The Calomiris,
Longhofer, and Miles study was designed to determine the causal rela-
tionships between prices and foreclosures on a macro-economic level (in
other words: does the decrease in price cause the foreclosure or does the
foreclosure cause the decrease in price?). °7 The research was significant
because it was the first such macro-level study and its findings would be
pertinent to the controversy between those who fear that accelerating
foreclosures "will cause further distress for home prices," and those who
fear "dragging out the liquidation process leads to prolonged large nega-
100. See, e.g., Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Household Leverage and the Recession of 2007 to 2009
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15896, 2010), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/ w15896.pdf (originally presented in 2009); see also Guido Lorenzoni, Inefficient
Credit Booms 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13639, 2007), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w13639. pdf.
101. See MURPHY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 56, at 7, 13.
102. Mian & Sufi, supra note 100, at 4, 20.
103. See, e.g., MURPHY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 56, at 7, 13; see also Booth &
Luttrell, supra note 47, at 1-3.
104. See EDWARD VINCENT. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22943, H.R. 6076: HOME
RETENTION AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 1-2 (2008), available at http://
digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/ 67531/metacrsl0787/ml/1/high_res d/RS22943_2008Aug29.pdf.
105. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 68-72 (citing
interventions to reduce foreclosures such as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008;
the foreclosure moratoria in Maryland and Nevada; the Obama Administration's Home
Affordability Modification Program of 2009; the Federal Reserve's purchases of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac government-sponsored-entity bonds, which eased mortgage rates and supported
home prices; and mortgage modification plans).
106. See Charles W. Calomiris, Stanley D. Longhofer & William Miles, The Foreclosure-
House Price Nexus: A Panel VAR Model for U.S. States, 1981-2009, at 11 (March 1, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l160
062 (suggesting the correlation between foreclosures and prices is driven by strategic choices of
homeowners and lenders); Chatterjee & Eyigungor, supra note 5, (explaining that delays in the
foreclosure system cause a rise in the number of foreclosures).
107. Calomiris, Longhofer & Miles, supra note 106, at 2.
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tive effects on [the economy]."1 °8 The key finding of the study was that
the negative price effect of a foreclosure is small and transitory-which
they note "stands in contrast to some of the popular wisdom about the
connections between foreclosures and prices."'1 9 In fact, they found that
the long-term impact of price declines on foreclosures "is 79 percent
larger than the impact of foreclosures on prices.""'  The report con-
cludes by suggesting that "[t]he decline in house prices between 2007
and 2009 was driven mainly by shocks originating elsewhere, and
reflected in shocks to housing sales, which in turn likely reflect the steep
recession's effect on housing demand."''
Similarly, the research of Chatterjee and Eyigungor sought to
answer the question: "[I]f we prevented foreclosures, would house prices
fall less?"' 12 Like Calomiris, they found a small correlation between the
rise in foreclosures and drop in house prices; but more importantly, they
found that without any foreclosures, "the drop in house prices would still
be 84% of the observed drop in house prices."' 1' 3 In addition, their find-
ings go further to specify that "the factor most responsible for the drop
in house prices is the disruption in the flow of credit to homebuyers."' 14
They found that tight credit accounted for 71% of the drop in house
prices between the second quarters of 2006 and 2009.115
The corroborating findings of the two economic studies clearly
diminish the relevance of any spill-over effect of foreclosures on house
prices and the economy. Consequently, the findings also refute any justi-
fication for government intervention intended to slow foreclosures with
the hope of that stability in housing price would follow. The well-
intended delays in the foreclosure process imposed by federal, state, and
108. Id. at 3 (citing Ali Anari et al., Bank Asset Liquidation and the Propagation of the Great
Depression, 37 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 753 (2005)).
109. Id. at 26. The authors of this study examined the details of several studies that found
negative effects of foreclosures on home prices. See id. at 4-8. "At the micro level, the general
conclusion [wa]s that rising foreclosures do lower house prices, although different authors f[ou]nd
varying magnitudes for that effect. Id. at 7. The authors identify the variables and limitations of
each study, such as limited locations of sample set, multiple simultaneous influences, other
differences in sample driving results, and the failure to distinguish a "distress" effect from a
"supply" impact. Id. at 4-8. The authors noted one study that found "that the marginal impact of
additional foreclosures declines as foreclosures increase." Id. at 5 (citing William H. Rogers &
William Winter, The Impact of Foreclosures on Neighboring Housing Sales, 31 J. REAL EST. RES.
455 (2009)). The authors provide details of their research design model, explaining how it
"captures the dynamic linkages" among multiple variables using comprehensive state level data
for the United States from 1981 to 2009. See id. at 8-10.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Chatterjee & Eyigungor, supra note 5, at 32.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
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local activists will not stabilize housing prices and, unfortunately, will
likely cause long-term negative effects on the broader economy.
VI. FEDERAL PROGRAMS ADJUST AS CAUSES FOR
DEFAULT CHANGE OVER TIME
The crisis began as early as 2005 with "a surge in subprime foreclo-
sures" in a few housing markets." 6 The subprime loans in many areas
didn't initially cause problems due to the rapid appreciation in home
prices." 7 By the second half of 2006, however, home prices in most
places started to flatten or decline, which, in turn, caused foreclosures to
increase in more places." 8 "By 2009, as unemployment continued to
rise, the number of foreclosures of prime loans had begun to overtake
the number of subprime foreclosures . ".1.."19 The spike in foreclosures
at that time was worse in the areas where there had been a rapid increase
in home prices. 20 Now, more than five years after the onset of the hous-
ing crisis, there is still severe weakness in most housing markets. During
this period, the central premise of each federal program created was that
more mortgage modifications are necessary and that these modifications
will improve the housing and mortgage markets.
Initially, it was thought that the financial crisis and its repercus-
sions for the housing market were mainly attributed to subprime lending
and the mass origination of unaffordable or unsustainable mortgages.
121
The number of high risk loans increased from about $125 billion or 12%
of all U.S. loan originations in 2000, to about $1 trillion or 34% of all
loan originations in 2006.122 Altogether from 2000 to 2007, U.S. lenders
originated about 14.4 million high risk loans. 1 2 3 The majority of those
loans (59%) were used to refinance an existing loan, rather than to buy a
116. Immergluck et al., supra note 77, at 1.
117. Id.
118. Delinquencies on home mortgages began to rise, resulting in an increase in foreclosures.
Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey Results Q4 2011, at 5-7 (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.imba.org/files/public/NDSQ411.pdf
119. Immergluck et al., supra note 77, at 1.
120. Immergluck et al., supra note 77, at 1.
121. See CHRISTOPHER L. FooTE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF Bos., PUBLIC POLICY
DIsCuSSIoN PAPERS No. 09-2, REDUCING FORECLOSURES 4 & n.7 (2009), available at http://~www.
bostonfed.org/ economic/ppdp/2009/ppdpO9O2.pdf; see also id. at 1 ("One of the most influential
strands of thought contends that the crisis can be attenuated by changing the terms of
'unaffordable' mortgages.... Proponents of this view, however, worry that without government
intervention, this win-win outcome will not occur.").
122. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 1 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09848r.pdf.
123. Id. at 4.
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new home. 124
In 2008, the concern was "affordability," so foreclosure-prevention
policies focused on resolving issues of high debt-to-income ("DTI")
ratios and interest-rate resets. 25 Many of the proposals used either mod-
ification or forbearance (or some combination of the tWO). 1 26 Modifica-
tion changes the terms of the loan (a reduction in the interest rate or
principal balance). 127 "Forbearance, on the other hand, involves a lender
temporarily agreeing to accept lower payments, without changing any of
the original terms of the loan."'128 Economists were predicting in 2008
that about 8% of the underwater mortgages would actually result in a
default and that fear of massive "walk away" defaults was unlikely (as
discussed below, the 8% prediction was far too low). 129 They concluded
that forbearance is a more effective tool for reducing foreclosures
because it "allow[s] borrowers to delay, but not to avoid eventually
repaying the mortgage in full."' 3 ° Similarly, economists suggested that
lowering current mortgage payments "can help at-risk borrowers" and
make default less likely "without generating serious moral hazard
problems, involving assistance, funded at the public's expense, to those
who do not need it.'
131
In 2009, the economic recession and unemployment-which
reached a twenty-six-year high of 10.2% in October 2009-created new
issues to deal with in addition to the existing challenges related to fore-
closure.1 32 For example, foreclosures were being seen in a whole new
demographic: borrowers with good credit and good loans who were
walking away from homes. In May 2009, the Mortgage Bankers Associ-
124. See id. at 24. Many of these borrowers "refinanced their mortgages at a higher amount
than the loan balance to convert their home equity into money for personal use (known as 'cash-
out refinancing')." Id. at 7. "Of the subprime mortgages originated from 2000 through 2007, 55
percent were for cash-out refinancing, 9 percent were for no-cash-out refinancing, and 36 percent
were for a home purchase." Id.
125. See JONES, supra note 61, at 10-11, 16-18.
126. See CHRISTOPHER L. FooTE, KRISTOPHER GERARDI & PAUL S. WILLEN, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF Bos., PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 08-3, NEGATIVE EQUITY AND




129. See, e.g., id. at 2, 11. Cf id. at 2-4 (using data from a recession in the early 1990s where
homeowners faced negative equity and finding that not all borrowers with negative equity will
default on their mortgages, which made it difficult to determine which borrowers actually require
help in order to prevent foreclosure and which ones do not).
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id.
132. See Peter Goodman, U.S. Unemployment Rate Hits 10.2%, Highest in 26 Years, N.Y.
TvMEs (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/business/economy/O7jobs.html?r=2
&hp.
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ation reported that prime borrowers accounted for the largest share of
new foreclosures. 133 The economic research in 2009 indicated that the
source of mortgage defaults "appear[ed] to be the interaction of falling
prices [creating negative equity] and adverse life events [such as job
loss].'"134 "Temporary assistance," they suggested, "may not help bor-
rowers facing permanent income shocks, but it would help borrowers
undergoing transitory setbacks." '135
In 2008, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act ("HERA") which included a $300 billion foreclosure prevention
component, Hope for Homeowners ("H4H"), to be administered by the
Federal Housing Administration. The purpose of H4H was to refinance
the loans of distressed borrowers by requiring lenders to write-down
borrowers' mortgages and then refinance the home for not more than
90% of the current value. But, the program was ill equipped to handle
the large amount of borrowers with second and sometimes even third
mortgages. Junior lien holders opposed agreeing to refinancing terms
that essentially wiped out their interests. 136 Because of this and other
issues, the first two and a half months that H4H began operating only
312 applications were received throughout the whole country. In order
to increase participation, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment ("HUD") attempted to modify the program to increase the loan
amount to a maximum of 96.5% of appraised value of the home, but this
change was ineffective.
In 2009, the Obama Administration revealed its Making Home
Affordable ("MHA") plan which was another attempt at reducing fore-
closures.1 37 MHA pledged additional capital to the GSEs and also
entailed two primary programs, the Home Affordable Refinance Pro-
gram ("HARP") and the Home Affordable Modification Program
("HAMP"). HARP permitted the refinancing of present GSE loans of
up to 105% of the market value. HAMP, the more ambitious component
of MHA, "called on lenders to reduce mortgage payments to 38 percent
of borrower income, after which the federal government would pay 50
percent of the cost of reducing them to 31 percent of income." 138 Addi-
tionally, HAMP offered a method to evaluate a borrower's claim for
133. Peter Coy, Foreclosure: Now an Upscale Blight, BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2009), http://
www.businessweek.comlmagazine/content/09-24/b4l35026913979.htm?chan=top+news-top+
news+index+-+temp-top+story.
134. FooTE ET AL., supra note 121, at 3 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 7.
136. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 61, at 13 ("Any second lien-holders are required to release
their liens ... and second lien-holders were compensated for releasing their liens with a share of
any future profit from the home's eventual sale.").
137. See id. at 9.
138. Immergluck et al., supra note 77, at 8.
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loan modifications and modification process. However, after the first
year, the number of loan modifications that re-defaulted and were
dropped from the program surpassed the number of new modifica-
tions. 1 39 By late 2010, even the pace of temporary modifications had
begun to slow. Questions were raised in 2009 by the Congressional
Oversight Panel ("COP") regarding whether HAMP would merely fore-
stall foreclosure for many homeowners because so many re-defaulted. 14o
In 2010, unemployment emerged as a key "driver of delinquencies
and foreclosures," undermining efforts for any loan modification under
HAMP.' 4 ' Once again, the COP suggested that "the best foreclosure
mitigation initiative would be a sound economy with low unemploy-
ment." 1 42 In response to challenges posed by "second lien mortgages,
unemployed borrowers, and borrowers with negative equity," new pro-
grams were implemented.' 43 The Second Lien Modification Program
offers incentive payments to servicers, borrowers, and second-lien hold-
ers for their voluntary participation. I44 However, the program to date has
seen relatively little use. The Hardest Hit Fund is a "program designed
in part to deal with the problem of unemployed homeowners." '145 It "pro-
vides TARP money to state-run foreclosure mitigation programs in spe-
cific states hit hardest by home value decreases and unemployment."
14 6
The HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative attempts to deal with
negative equity by incentivizing lenders to grant a principal reduction
and also includes an equity sharing option.147 The "Home Affordable
Foreclosure Alternative and the FHA Short Refinance Program are also
intended to address problems caused by negative equity" through "the
use of short sales and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure for HAMP-eligible
borrowers who are underwater and unable to qualify for
modifications.' 48
In October 2011, in an effort to adjust to the evolving foreclosure
problem, the Administration announced that the Home Affordable Refi-
nance Program ("HARP"), introduced in 2009, would be revamped and
139. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: SERVICER
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH OCTOBER 2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/inifiatives/financial-stability/resutsMHA-ReportsDocuments/Oct%202010%2MHA% 20
Public%20Final.pdf.
140. See generally CONG. OvERSIGrr PANEL, FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, 68-95 (describing
the HAMP program).
141. Id. at 73.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id. at 81.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 82.
148. Id. at 83.
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extended through December 31, 2013.149 In order to be eligible for refi-
nancing, the original loan must be owned or guaranteed by Fannie or
Freddie and the loan must have a securitization date prior to June 1,
2009.150 The biggest change is the removal of the 125% loan-to-value
ceiling, which will allow many more homeowners to qualify for the pro-
gram.151 HARP allows homeowners facing difficulties refinancing
through conventional methods because of little or negative equity to
apply for the refinancing of their mortgage at the current lower interest
rates. Removing previous loan-to-value ceilings will allow homeowners
who are severely underwater due to plummeting property values to take
out new loans at today's lower interest rates.15z The amendments also
reduce borrowing fees and eliminate some appraisals. The key incentive
for lenders is the waiver of representations and warranties by Fannie or
Freddie. 53 "The lender will not be responsible for any of the representa-
tions and warranties associated with the original loan." '154 "The lender is
also relieved of the standard underwriting representations and warranties
with respect to the new mortgage loan as long as the data in the case file
is complete and program instructions are followed for collecting infor-
mation on income, employment, assets, and fieldwork."1 55 "Administra-
tion officials . . . hop[e] that eliminating the risk associated with
rep[resentation]s and warranties-whether transferred from the original
loan or on the new loan-will spark ... competition among lenders to
help homeowners get into the program." 156
VII. WHY HAVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS FAILED TO STABILIZE
THE HOUSING MARKET?
U.S. household real estate values have plummeted from $20.85 tril-
lion in 2007 down to $15.96 trillion in December 2011-for a loss of
approximately 4.89 trillion dollars.
1 57
149. FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE ANNOUNCEMENT SEL-2011-12, at 1 (2011), available at
https://www. efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/201 /sell 1 12.pdf.
150. See FANNIE MAE, HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE (DU REFI PLUS AND REFI PLUS) FAQs
6 (2012), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/mha/mharefi/pdf/refinancefaqs.pdf.




154. Carrie Bay, Fannie and Freddie Detail New HARP Guidelines, DS NEws (Nov. 15,
2011), http:// www.dsnews.com/articles/print-view/fannie-and-freddie-detail-new-harp-guide
lines-2011-11-15.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id.
157. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States:
Flows and Outstandings Fourth Quarter 2011, FED. RES. STAT. RELEASE, Mar. 8, 2012, at 106
tbl.B.100, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20120308/zI.pdf.
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A. Deleveraging: The Unwinding of Debt by Homeowners
The dramatic growth of household debt and leverage between 2002
and 2006 was a key factor contributing to the onset of the recession that
began in December 2007.158 In the mid-1980s, the ratio of debt to per-
sonal disposable income for American households was 65%, but it had
more than doubled to 133% by 2007.' A combination of several fac-
tors encouraged increased household borrowing. 160 Low interest rates
and access to easy mortgage credit permitted homes to be purchased
with little or no down payment. 161 "Many of these purchases [we]re
structured with a first loan that cover[ed] 80 percent of the value of the
house and a second loan ... taken out at the same time" for the balance
of the purchase price. 162
Rising real estate prices were both a cause and a consequence of
increased borrowing: as property prices rose, buyers borrowed more to
purchase them, thereby pushing up prices even more.1 63 "The rapid rise
in household net worth encouraged lenders to ease credit even further
based on the assumption that house price appreciation would continue
indefinitely."1 64 Homeowners used refinancing or lines of credit to
extract the equity from rapidly appreciating home values, which "pro-
vided hundreds of billions of dollars per year in spendable cash ... that
was used to pay for a variety of goods and services." 165 The growth of
alternative mortgage products and the expansion of the market for
securitized loans also promoted increased household borrowing. 166 The
158. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 100, at 3, 20-23.
159. See Reuven Glick & Kevin J. Lansing, U.S. Household Deleveraging and Future
Consumption Growth, FRBSF EcON. LETTER, May 15, 2009, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Glick & Lansing,
Household Deleveraging] available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/econoniics/letter/2009/
e12009-16.pdf.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1-2.
162. Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Address
Before the New England Economic Partnership's Spring Economic Outlook Conference on
Credit, Housing, and the Consequences for New England: Current Challenges in Housing and
Home Loans: Complicating Factors and the Implications for Policymakers 11 (May 30, 2008),
available at http://www/bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2008/053008.pdf. In Massachusetts,
these second loans increased from 26% in 2003 to 65% of subprime mortgages in the third quarter
of 2005. Id. at 11.
163. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 100, at 7.
164. Reuven Glick & Kevin J. Lansing, Consumers and the Economy, Part : Household
Credit and Personal Saving, FRBSF EcON. LEIrER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 1, 4, available at http:/
www.frbsf.org/ publications/economics/letter/201 1/el201 1-01 .pdf.
165. See, e.g., Glick & Lansing, Household Deleveraging, supra note 159, at 2.
166. See generally EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33775, ALTERNATIVE
MORTGAGES: CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TROUBLED MORTGAGE RESETS IN THE
SUBPRIME AND ALT-A MARKETS 2-7 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL33775_20081008.pdf (explaining that alternative mortgages encompassed a variety of risky
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rise in household debt coincided with a decline in the personal saving
rate. 167
Economist Hyman Minsky proposed a "financial instability hypoth-
esis." 168 Minsky "argued that prosperous times can often induce borrow-
ers to accumulate debt beyond their ability to repay out of current
income, thus leading to financial crises and severe economic contrac-
tions."' 6 9 The facts surrounding the current crisis clearly support
Minksy's hypothesis. U.S. households are in the process of deleveraging
their debt. That process may take years, and it can take different paths
that will impact the economy in different ways. In households with little
or no savings, deleveraging usually occurs through default, which shifts
the loss to the lender or the taxpayer if the loan is government-
insured.17 ° For example, when a borrower is faced with a choice
between paying a home loan and a credit card, liquidity concerns drive
borrowers to pay the credit card first.17 Consumer consumption can
then be maintained, but the home will eventually be foreclosed. t For
some households, repayment of the debt will strain the buyer's finances
but may not end in default. Instead, deleveraging causes a reduction in
other spending and increased saving, which in turn slows economic
growth and increases unemployment.' 73
Recent economic studies have concluded that the accumulation of a
high level of household debt prior to the financial crisis led to a severe
and prolonged pull-back in consumption when housing prices col-
lapsed.174 Researchers concluded that high debt, loss of access to home
mortgage products, including adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs"), extremely low or zero down
payment mortgages, interest-only mortgages, and negative amortization mortgages).
167. Reuven Glick & Kevin J. Lansing, Consumers and the Economy, Part I: Household
Credit and Personal Saving, FRBSF ECON. Letter, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/letter/201 I/el201 1-01 .html.
168. See Glick & Lansing, Household Deleveraging, supra note 159, at 3 (discussing Minksy's
work).
169. Id. at 3.
170. See Reuven Glick & Kevin J. Lansing, Global Household Leverage, House Prices, and
Consumption, FRBSF EcoN. LEI-ER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-01 .pdf.
171. See Ethan Cohen-Cole & Jonathan Morse, Your House or Your Credit Card, Which
Would You Choose?: Personal Delinquency Tradeoffs and Precautionary Liquidity Motives 2, 24
(Fed. Reserve of Bos., Working Paper No. QAU09-5, 2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/
bankinfolqau/wp/20091 qau0905.pdf.
172. See id.
173. See generally Amir Sufi, Atif Mian & Kamalesh Rao, Household Balance Sheets and the
Weak Recovery (November 2011) (unpublished presentation) [hereinafter Sufi et al., Weak
Recovery], available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufilMianSufi-summaryNov2Ol1-
public.pdf.
174. See, e.g., Veronica Guerrieri & Guido Lorenzoni, Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings,
and the Liquidity Trap 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17583, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1960130; Atif Mianet al.,
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equity lines of credit, and the inability to refinance at lower rates caused
a strong "pull-back" in consumption of goods (other than construc-
tion).175 They contend that this deleveraging and consumption pull-back
also explains 65% of job losses from 2007 to 2009.176
B. Negative Equity
The use of debt to acquire an asset, such as a house, magnifies the
buyer's assumed risk. If a homeowner owns a house with positive equity
but faces problems in making mortgage payments, the homeowner can
either refinance or sell the home to recover the positive equity position.
The homeowner is more likely to be able to avoid foreclosure if he has
positive equity. However, if the value of the asset drops, the debt
incurred to buy the asset must still be paid in full. If that debt exceeds
the asset's market value, refinancing options are limited. 177 With the
plummeting of home prices between 2006 and 2011, millions of home-
owners found themselves facing this dilemma of limited refinancing
options due to owing more on their mortgages than the current market
value of the home.'78
The extraordinary decline in home prices from their peak in 2006
provides a clear reason why so many homeowners are facing negative
equity problems. S&P/Case-Shiller data of January 2012 shows that
home prices are down from their peak in all twenty metro areas tracked,
with Dallas in the best shape (-10.9%) and Las Vegas in the worst (-
61.6%). 119 But what is more troubling is that in January 2012, eight of
the twenty metro areas tracked were at their lowest price points since the
crisis began.18 ° Due to the decline in home prices, 11.1 million Ameri-
can homes had negative equity at the end of December 2011 according
to CoreLogic, a data and analytics company.' Additionally, "2.5 mil-
Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the Economic Slump 5 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/?aea/2012conference/program/retrieve.php??pdf
id=136.
175. See generally Sufi et al., Weak Recovery, supra note 173.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Yongheng Deng, John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Mortgage Terminations,
Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68 ECONOMETRICA 275, 277-78 (2000),
available at http:// urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/dqv_2000pb.pdf.
178. See Press Release, CoreLogic, supra note 44 (noting that negative equity significantly
limits the ability of borrowers to capture the benefit of the current low interest rate environment).
179. See David Blitzer, How the Cities Did in January, HousINGIVmws (Mar. 30, 2012), http://
www.housingviews.com/2012/03/30/how-the-cities-did-in-january.
180. See id.
181. See Press Release, CoreLogic, CoreLogic Reports Negative Equity Increase in Q4 2011
(Mar. 01, 2012), available at http://www.corelogic.conabout-us/news/asset-upload-file909_144
36.pdf.
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lion borrowers had less than five percent equity.118 2 "Together, negative
equity and near-negative equity mortgages accounted for 27.8 percent
[or more than one out of every four] residential... mortgage[s] nation-
wide . . . up from 27.1 in the [third quarter of 2011]. ' 83 "[T]he total
mortgage debt outstanding on properties in negative equity increased
from $2.7 trillion in the third quarter [of 2011] to $2.8 trillion in the
fourth quarter."' 84 Mark Fleming, chief economist with CoreLogic fur-
ther reports that "[t]he negative equity share is back to the same level as
Q3 2009, which is when we began reporting negative equity using this
methodology." '85 This data tends to indicate that the bottom of the fore-
closure crisis may not have been reached.
Price declines and loss of homeowner equity are central contribu-
tors to mortgage default. 186 In fact, negative equity is a more significant
element than unemployment in causing foreclosures.' 87 If there is little
hope that the price of the house will recover to exceed the outstanding
balance on the mortgage, the borrower may engage in "strategic default"
and simply walk away from the home.188 Many homeowners rationally
conclude that they will be better off financially in the long run if they
walk away from their mortgage. 89 According to Fleming, "[h]igh nega-
tive equity is holding back refinancing and sales activity and is a major
impediment to the housing market recovery. The hardest hit markets
have improved over the last year, primarily as a result of foreclosures.
But nationally, the level of mortgage debt remains high relative to home
prices."' 9°
C. Changing Credit Standards
The mortgage credit standard used to determine whether potential
homebuyers qualify for a loan was a major factor contributing to the
creation of the financial crisis and is now a major factor that hampers the




185. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See FooTE, GERARDi & WILLEN, supra note 126, at 11; Calomiris, Longhofer & Miles,
supra note 106, at 26-27; see also generally Neil Bhutta et al., The Depth of Negative Equity and
Mortgage Default Decisions (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf (discussing strategic
defaults and the factors affecting the decision therein).
187. See FooTE, GERARDi & WLLEN, supra note 126, at 12-14; Stan Leibowitz, New Evidence
on the Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, at A13.
188. See Bhutta et al., supra note 186, at 3.
189. See Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 88, at 28; Leibowitz, supra note 187.
190. Press Release, CoreLogic, supra note 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. John V. Duca, John Muellbauer & Anthony Murphy, House Prices and Credit
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underwriting of shaky mortgages such as loans with low or no down
payments, increased debt ratios, impaired credit, no documentation, and
negative loan amortization.' 92 This was a drastic change when compared
to loan standards that were common in the early 1990s.' 9 3
Lenders shifted from originating and holding mortgages to originat-
ing, selling, pooling, securitizing, and then packaging them for sale to
investors. New financial products and alternative mortgages enabled
millions of Americans who had not previously qualified to buy a home
to become owners. Between 2002 and 2006, 9.1 million new homes
were built. 194 Because of the relaxed credit standards prior to the crisis,
the average loan-to-value ratio rose to 94%. 1 The lower down-pay-
ment requirements caused the demand for housing to increase which
caused prices and construction to increase' 96 This reinforced rising
home-price "expectations among borrowers and lenders," which again
increased lending and "further boost[ed] prices.'" '197
During the aftermath, mortgage credit standards have tightened and
most loans now require more income, collateral, and documentation.
Dodd-Frank has created new prohibitions and standards for various con-
sumer financial products, most notably, mortgage loans and, to a much
more limited extent, credit and debit cards. 198 Title XIV of the Act is a
maze of intertwined loan categories, requirements, and prohibitions.
These rules cover mortgage origination and servicing practices and cre-
ate remedies for borrowers if lenders break the rules. Some of the law's
provisions apply to any loan secured by the consumer's principal dwell-
ing, including for the first time, open end credit, and others only apply to
residential mortgage loans. The law also creates a new class of "quali-
fied mortgages" that are viewed as sufficiently safe to be sold into the
secondary market to be securitized and as sufficiently fair to allow safe
harbor from some of the prohibitions and restrictions imposed by the
Act.' 99 To qualify, a borrower must make a 20% down payment for
Constraints: Making Sense of the U.S. Experience 21-22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dali., Working
Paper No. 1103, 2011), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/
201 l/wpl 103.pdf.
192. See Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages,
ECON. LEVIER: INSIGHTS FROM THE FED. RES. BANK DALL., Nov. 2007, at 1-3, available at http:/
/www.dallasfed.org/ assets/documents/research/eclett/2007/eO711 .pdf.
193. See id.
194. Booth & Lutrell, supra note 47, at 1.
195. John V. Duca, David Luttrell & Anthony Murphy, When Will the U.S. Housing Market
Stabilize?, ECON. LEITER: INSIGHTS FROM THE FED. RES. BANK DALL., Aug. 2011, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/eclett/20 11/el I 108.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1403, 124 Stat. 2139-41 (2010).
199. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1412(b)(3)(B)(2), 124 Stat. 2148 (2010).
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mortgage lenders to be exempt from holding 5% of the loan's risk. The
Act also imposes an obligation on the lender to determine the borrower's
"reasonable ability to repay" a loan. 2' As a result, fewer loans are being
made, dampening housing demand along with prices and
construction.2 ° l
D. Securitization and Mortgage Servicer Issues
Throughout the past decade, much home acquisition debt was
securitized. Undoubtedly, the widespread emergence of borrower default
and foreclosure currently being experienced was not contemplated in the
legal structure of securitizations or in the terms of the Pooling and Ser-
vicing Agreements ("PSA"). The legal restrictions imposed by these
agreements often act as a major impediment to servicers' willingness to
modify loans in order to prevent a foreclosure. The beginning of the
securitization process parallels that of a traditional real estate transac-
tion. Mortgages are originated through banks and mortgage brokers.
When they are sold in the secondary market, they can be left intact, but
they are often securitized and then separated into groups (tranches) on
the basis of certain common characteristics. The mortgages are securi-
tized by investment banks (the sponsors) through the use of trusts that
qualify for Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC") sta-
tus.2 0 2 These trusts are tax-exempt vehicles that pool the mortgages
transferred to them and sell interests in the income stream from those
mortgages to investors in the form of shares, or MBSs. 2°3 The governing
document for securitizations, the PSA, includes various representations
and warranties for the underlying mortgages.2° It also describes the
responsibilities of the trustee, holding the recorded mortgage documents,
and of the servicer, playing an administrative role, collecting and dis-
bursing mortgage payments on behalf of the investors in the MBSs.
There are two crucial issues facing servicers when considering loan
modifications. The first is protecting the tax-exempt status of pass-
through REMIC. Pass-through REMICs are security structures which act
as tax-free conduits for the funds for certificate holders of various clas-
ses of securities. In order to qualify for the tax-exempt status, the
200. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011) ("[N]o creditor
may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is
consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and
all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments."
(emphasis added)).
201. See Duca, Luttrell & Murphy, supra note 195, at 2-3.
202. See 1 STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS § 5:2 (3d ed. 2011).
203. See id.
204. See generally id. § 5:4 (discussing typical PSA contents and variations).
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REMIC trust must hold a fixed pool of mortgages; that is, loans cannot
be added or substituted. This creates a serious impediment to the modifi-
cation of distressed loans because of the risk that the IRS may interpret a
loan modification as the equivalent of a prohibited loan substitution,
thereby revoking tax-exempt status.205 The second issue for servicers is
protecting investor interests. Most MBSs have a range of credit qualities.
The highest-rated tranches pay out to investors first; the lowest-rated
tranches are paid last. A modification that lowers a homeowner's pay-
ments will first affect the lowest-rated tranches in the pool, leaving those
with higher ratings untouched. 0 6 It was thought that servicers were
reluctant to modify securitized loans because of concerns that investors
may sue them, alleging breach of a PSA obligation. To minimize this
concern, Congress enacted "safe harbor" legislation limiting servicer lia-
bility as a result of loan modifications.2 7
Modifying a securitized loan was also complicated by the fact that
many properties had a second mortgage. These loans were frequently
securitized, with the first mortgage and the second loan being sold into
separate portfolios.20 8 Servicers of a first mortgage will not voluntarily
reduce principal or interest payments that would simply flow to a for-
merly worthless second mortgage. The combination of second loans,
securitization, and legal complexities makes it much more difficult to
modify loans, particularly if the first and second mortgages have been
packaged into separate securitizations. "Dealing with two different lend-
ers or servicers, as well as different securitizations [and different loan
servicing agreements], can significantly complicate efforts to restructure
loans. 209
Policymakers have presumed a lender would be better off modify-
ing a delinquent loan and taking a small loss, rather than foreclosing and
suffering a large loss. However, the costs and benefits of loan modifica-
205. See id. § 5:2. But cf MANUEL ADELINO ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF Bos., PUBLIC
POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 09-4, WHY DON'T LENDERS RENEGOTIATE MORE HoME
MORTGAGES? REDEFAULTS, SELF-CuREs, AND SECUR1TIZATION 4 (2009), available at http:I/www.
bos.frb.org/ economic/ppdp/2009/ppdpO9O4.pdf ("[T]he SEC ruled in 2008 that if default was
'reasonably foreseeable,' then contact with a borrower prior to 60-day delinquency would not
affect the accounting status of the loan.").
206. See id. at 4, 7, 20. To compensate for risk, investors in lower-rated tranches receive a
higher interest rate on their investment, just like investors in "junk" bonds. Similarly, there are
mortgage-backed securities that have tranches separated out by interest and principal payments. In
those cases, modifications that lower the interest rate would reduce returns (relative to the original
loan) for investors in the interest only tranche while actually increasing returns for the principal-
only tranche.
207. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1404, 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(d) (Supp. IV 2011) (amending the Truth
in Lending Act).
208. See, e.g., Rosengren, supra note 162, at 12.
209. Id.
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tions are not clear. A 2009 study found that prior mortgage modification
programs did little to prevent foreclosure. 210 The study found that aver-
age re-default rates for modified loans over the period between 2005 and
2008 were 50% for mortgages as a whole and 70% for subprime mort-
gages.211 When the value of the house that collateralizes the loan is fall-
ing or when all parties know that the house has become unaffordable to
the borrower, the servicer may simply decide to take a loss now by fore-
closing rather than risk an even larger loss down the road. Therefore,
servicers may be acting in the best interests of the investors when they
foreclose because modifications do not always prevent foreclosures.
2 12
VIII. FORECLOSURE DELAYS INFLUENCE BORROWERS'
DEFAULT BEHAVIOR
Time required to complete the foreclosure process has increased
significantly in recent years. This increased time to complete the fore-
closure process has been attributed to new developments such as fore-
closure documentation issues, foreclosure moratoria, state and federal
mitigation efforts, and attempts to modify loans. As of September 2011,
Lender Processing Services ("LPS") reported that about 2.2 million
properties were in the foreclosure process, with 72% of owners having
made no payments in more than a year, and almost 40% having made no
payments in two years.213 The time frames to move a property through a
foreclosure to sale have increased from an average of 251 days in first
quarter of 2008 to 410 days by the fourth quarter of 2010; and at the end
of the third quarter of 2011, that average was 624 days.214 In January
20 10, the average time from foreclosure start to foreclosure sale in judi-
cial states was over 900 days. 15 However, not all homeowners in
210. See ADELINO ET AL., supra note 205, at 25.
211. See id. at 19; Cf Sanjiv R. Das, The Principal Principle 1, (Aug. 10, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at www.bnet.fordham.edu/FinanceResearch_Center/loanmod_Fordham.
pdf (citing Carrie Bay, Fitch: Subpar Loan Mod Results Making U.S. Coreclosures a Reality,
DSNEws (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.dsnews.conmarticles/fitch-subpar-loan-mod-results-making-
us-foreclosures-reality-2011-02-07); Sumit Agarwal et al., Market-Based Loss Mitigation
Practices for Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis 4, 19-21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., Working Paper No. 2011-03, 2010), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/
publications/working-papers/201 l/wp201 l_03.pdf (finding that the rate of re-default is affected
by many factors including the underlying loan characteristics (e.g. option ARM), loan
modification terms (reduce payment, interest, or principal), and the borrower's characteristics and
that modifications that include principal reduction with market rate interest reduction have a
greater success rate).
212. See FooTE ET AL., supra note 121, at 24-25.
213. See LENDER PROCESSING SERVS., supra note 12, at 3, 17.
214. Id. at 3.
215. See LENDER PROCESSING SERVS., LPS MORTGAGE MONITOR: FEBRUARY 2012 MORTGAGE
PERFORMANCE OBSERVATIONS 9 (2012), available at http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporate
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arrears suffer financial hardship due to unaffordable house payments.
Those with significant negative equity in their homes may choose to
strategically default even though they can afford to make the
payments.21 6
One study found that the number of strategic defaulters as a per-
centage of total defaulters rose to 35.1% in September 2010 from 26.4%
in March 2009.17 The researchers suggested that the growing lag
between delinquency and foreclosure provides an added inducement for
this form of default.21 8
Notably, in two independent studies in 2011, researchers found that
the increasing delay in foreclosures has a significant impact on borrower
default behavior.219 The research results show that borrowers who
expect longer foreclosure time have a higher propensity to default, and
that just a three-month increase in delay will increase the hazard of
default by more than 30%.22' The results were consistent across differ-
ent types of loans and credit scores. The reports explain that during the
delay period the "defaulting borrower could legally stay in the house
without making payments and enjoy "free rent. '221 The research found
that this benefit was an important factor in the increase in the foreclosure
rate.222 "The longer the delay, the [larger] the benefit the borrower could
obtain from default. '22 3 In the current market, where many borrowers
have negative equity, longer delays result in more strategic defaults,
thereby extending the malaise.224
Similarly, Andrew Jennings of FICO has estimated that "25-30% of
defaults are [already] premeditated. '225 He finds evidence of this effect
in patterns exhibited by lower-risk borrowers, including behavior such
Information/CommunicationCenter/DataReports/MortgageMonitor/LPS%2OMortgage%20
Monitor%20January%202012%20-%20Final.pdf.
216. See James R. Hagerty & Nick Timiraos, Currents: Debtor's Dilemma: Pay the Mortgage
or Walk Away - In Down Real-Estate Market, Homeowners Are Deciding to Abandon Their
Loan Obligations Even If They Can Afford the Payments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A22
(reporting evidence indicating that some borrowers have strategically purchased another home
before walking away from their current home).
217. Luigi Guiso et al., The Determinants of Attitudes Towards Strategic Default on
Mortgages (June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.
edu/faculty/sapienza/htm/GuisoSapienzaZingalesStrategicDefault.pdf.
218. Id. at 27.
219. See generally Chatterjee & Eyigungor, supra note 5, at 36 (explaining delays in the
foreclosure system cause a rise in the number of foreclosures); Zhu & Pace, supra note 5 (same).
220. Zhu & Pace, supra note 5, at 3.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Chatterjee & Eyigungor, supra note 5, at 36.
223. Zhu & Pace, supra note 5, at 1.
224. Id. at 3.
225. When the Roof Fell In, EcONoMIST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.comnode/
18250439.
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as taking out new loans on a different property prior to mortgage default
on a preexisting mortgage loan.226 Moreover, these practices are
reported to be more widespread in non-recourse states, where lenders
cannot make a claim on the borrower for any debt remaining after the
property is sold.227 Similar results have been found in other studies.22 8
IX. ROBO-SIGNING INQUIRY CREATES CONTAGION EFFECT
INCREASING FORECLOSURE DELAYS
In the fall of 2010, multiple allegations about foreclosure documen-
tation irregularities surfaced in several judicial foreclosure proceedings.
Employees or contractors of Bank of America, GMAC Mortgage, Ally
Financial and other major loan servicers "testified that they signed, and
in some cases backdated, thousands of documents" claiming "personal
knowledge of facts" related to mortgages when they did not have such
knowledge.229 Since that revelation, allegations of "robo-signing" have
given rise to ongoing federal and state investigations and have called
into question the basic validity of lenders' security interests in collateral
in courts across the country.
In twenty-two states, judicial oversight is required in foreclosure
proceedings.23 ° In these judicial foreclosure states, the mortgagee must
establish and prove its claim before a judge. In non-judicial states, a
foreclosure can proceed upon adequate and timely notice to the bor-
rower, as defined by statute. 231 A mortgage does not need to be recorded
to be enforceable between the mortgagor and the mortgagee or subse-
quent transferee, but unless a mortgage is recorded, it does not provide
the mortgagee or its subsequent transferee with priority over subsequent
mortgagees or lien holders.232 However, due to the rapid growth of
mortgage securitization, the secondary market may have exceeded the
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Observing Unobservables: Identifying
Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment, 77 ECONOMETRICA 1993,
1995 (2009) (finding that between 13 and 21% of default behavior can be attributed to moral
hazard on the part of the borrower).
229. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXAMINING THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE
MITIGATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER REPORT], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ CPRT- 11 IJPRT61835/pdf/CPRT-l 1I JPRT61835.pdf.
230. Mortgage Bankers Association, Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure 3 (Oct. 26,
2010), www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNon-JudiciaFore
closure.pdf.
231. MORTG. BANKERS ASS'N, JUDICIAL VERSUS NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 2 (2012),
available at www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNon-Judicial
Foreclosure.pdf.
232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 5.4 cmt. b (1997).
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ability of local county land record systems to track mortgage-loan own-
ership. A single mortgage loan that is securitized may be sold several
dozen times between different banks. To increase efficiency, the finan-
cial industry developed an electronic transfer process and created a com-
pany, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"),
that serves as the mortgagee of record in the county land records and
runs a database that tracks ownership and servicing rights of mortgage
loans.
The securitization process requires several properly executed trans-
fers, and the MERS electronic process often circumvents county prop-
erty offices.2 33 When the number of foreclosures began to increase,
some documentation issues were discovered and started an avalanche of
questions about a wide range of legal issues including the legality of
foreclosure proceedings and the legitimacy of MERS. 234 The problem is
compounded by the fact that resolution of each of these issues is con-
trolled by state law and lies in the hands of fifty states' judges and legis-
latures. Consequently, inconsistent and conflicting decisions create
uncertainty and hamper the ability of parties in the securitization process
to enforce foreclosure. MERS was used for years by the most active
participants in the securitization market, including the largest banks, and
processed over 60% of all MBSs.
235
The representations and warranties by the MBSs originator or seller
typically warrant good title, compliance with applicable law, underwrit-
ing standards, documentation of the loan and delivery of the mortgage
files.2 36 If any of these are breached and the breach materially affects the
value of a loan, the loan may be "put-back", 237 requiring the sponsor to
repurchase the loan for the outstanding principal balance plus any
accrued interest. Court rulings that the MERS process is unlawful under
state and local laws may create litigation claims for MBSs investors of
breach of representations and warranties by the MBSs originator. Argua-
233. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER REPORT, supra note 229, at 2; FED. RESERVE SYS.
ET AL., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES AND PRACTICESR 10-11 (2011),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/RptCongress/interagency-review-fore
closures_20110413.pdf.
234. See generally, LAW DEP'T, MERSCORP, INC. & MORTG. ELEC. REGISTRATION SYS., INC.,
CASE LAW OUTLINE: 2ND QUARTER 2011, at 7-93 (2011) available at http://www.mersinc.org/
files/filedownload. aspx?id=302&table=DownloadFile (summarizing cases where MERS and its
status is at issue and providing guidance for members as to the "official" position of MERS on
specific issues).
235. See Press Release, MERSCORP, Inc., SunTrust Becomes Third Major Mortgage Provider
in Recent Months to Require MERS System (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://mersinc.org/
media-room/press-release/archives-2010/27-media-roomlpress-release-archives/2010-articles/265-
suntrust-becomes-third-major-mortgage-provider-in-recent-months-to-require-mers-system.
236. See, e.g., SAFr, supra note 202, at § 5:3.
237. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER REPORT, supra note 229, at 17.
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bly, these rulings may also create defenses for the borrowers to delay the
foreclosure and enjoy free rent or perhaps be awarded the house free and
clear. The repercussions caused by the MERS problems could be cata-
strophic. As warned by the Congressional Oversight Panel:
This electronic process has, however, faced legal challenges that
could, in an extreme scenario, call into question the validity of 33
million mortgage loans.
If such problems were to arise on a large scale, the housing market
could experience even greater disruptions than have already occurred,
resulting in significant harm to major financial institutions. For exam-
ple, if a Wall Street bank were to discover that, due to shoddily exe-
cuted paperwork, it still owns millions of defaulted mortgages that it
thought it sold off years ago, it could face billions of dollars in unex-
pected losses.238
On April 13, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board issued a joint report
on the investigation of foreclosure practices of servicers arising out of
the robo-signing allegations. 239 The report noted certain deficiencies in
servicer performance relating to foreclosures and issued enforcement
orders against some servicers. However, it was also reported that in most
cases servicers had proper documentation, and the foreclosed loans were
seriously delinquent. 240 The report emphasized that delaying foreclo-
sures will have a negative impact on the economy.241 Significantly, the
interagency panel stated that "a uniform set of national mortgage-servic-
ing and foreclosure-processing standards would help promote accounta-
bility and appropriateness in dealing with consumers and strengthen the
housing finance market. 242
At the conclusion of a separate investigation into robo-signing
practices, on July 7, 2011, an FDIC division director reported to Con-
gress that "[t]he mortgage-servicing system ... has impaired the health
and recovery of the housing and mortgage markets. ' 243 The results of
238. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER REPORT, supra note 229, at 2.
239. See FED. RESERVE Sys. ET AL., supra note 233.
240. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at the
Half-Year Mark: Hearing on Continuing the Oversight of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 72 (2011) (prepared
statement of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency), available at http:/Iwww.gpo.go-v/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 1 12shrg65718/ pdf/ CHRG- 1 12shrg65718.pdf.
241. FED. RESERVE Sys. ET AL., supra note 233, at 5-6 (discussing the impact 'on the
borrowers, industry, investors, judicial process, mortgage market, and communities).
242. Id. at 15.
243. Mortgage Servicing: An Examination of the Role of Federal Regulators in Settlement
Negotiations and the Future of Mortgage Servicing Standards Before the Subcomms. on Fin.
lnsts. & Consumer Credit & on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 105 (2011) (prepared statement of Mark Pearce, Director, Division of Depositor &
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their investigation caused the FDIC to request that the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council "examin[e] the potential financial systemic risks
surrounding mortgage servicing and foreclosures." '244 The FDIC's inves-
tigation discovered that there were 67 borrower class-action suits pend-
ing in 23 states "challenging foreclosures based upon [alleged] robo-
signing[s], defective assignments, [and] reliance upon [MERS]. ' ' 4 5
There are also tens of thousands of individual state court foreclosure
proceedings where borrowers are asserting a variety of allegations that
are forestalling foreclosures. 2 4 6 It was noted that similar actions could
proliferate, and until resolved, would create market uncertainty "dis-
courag[ing] the return of private capital to the mortgage market. 247
Despite the fact that agency investigations found that essentially all
of the loans foreclosed were in serious default and that servicers had
possession of all loan and mortgage documents, there has been an over-
whelming outcry of moral indignation and allegations of fraud with a
campaign slogan of "show the note!"2 48 Consistent with the advice of a
former Chief of Staff to never let a crisis go to waste, a cottage industry
has erupted to help homeowners negotiate, defend, delay, and avoid
foreclosure. However, the well-intended efforts of state actors to stop or
delay foreclosures are really attempts to re-allocate losses that have
already been allocated by contract. Such actions create incentives for
others to engage in the same tactics, creating the risk of contagion and
unintended consequences.
X. STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS THAT DELAY FORECLOSURE
A newly enacted Nevada law that imposes substantial obstacles in
the foreclosure process became effective on October 1, 2011. This
resulted from the enactment of a new law that became effective October
1, 2011, in Nevada that imposed substantial obstacles in the foreclosure
process. 249 The law requires any notice of default to include a notarized
affidavit attesting to the full name and address of the current and any
prior beneficiary of the deed of trust (i.e., the mortgage), the amounts
due, the actual or constructive possession of the note and deed of trust,
Consumer Protection, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at http://financial
services.house.gov/uploadedfiles/1 12-44.pdf.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 101.
246. See id. at 100.
247. Id. at 97.
248. Julie Schmit, Homeowners use 'show me the note' to fight foreclosure, USA TODAY
(Dec. 21, 2010, 8:06 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-12-21 -
mortgagenote2l CV N.htm.
249. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.080 (2011).
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as well as the authority to foreclose.25 ° The problem is that the affiant
must testify based on "personal knowledge" as to all of the items con-
tained in the affidavit. 21 Failure to comply is subject to a civil penalty,
and the penalty to make false representations was made a felony.252 The
law also creates a private right of action for borrowers, which includes
attorneys' fees and treble damages, when a trustee does not "comply
with any requirement" of the foreclosure. 3 In practice, it is not likely
that there is a representative for any servicer that will be able to provide
testimony based on personal knowledge to all of the items required. It
has been generally accepted that statements or testimony from a benefi-
ciary, servicer, or trustee is based on the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. A second important change under the Nevada law
requires each assignment of a mortgage or the beneficial interest under a
deed of trust to be filed with the county recorder's office in the county
where the home is located . 4 This appears to be designed to stop the use
of MERS and force the recordation of transfers of all beneficial interest
in mortgage loans to be made in county recorders' offices. The third
change under the law provides that a foreclosure sale that does not sub-
stantially comply "must" be declared void.255 It also creates a second
private cause of action against the trustee or beneficiary, allowing treble
damages, attorney's fees and costs "unless the court finds good cause for
a different award. 2 5 6 It is plain to see why this has had a chilling effect
on the filing of new foreclosure proceedings.
A recent study reported legislative changes affecting mortgage
foreclosure that were adopted after the financial crisis by states that use
a non-judicial foreclosure process.2 5 ' Between January 2005 and May
2010, there were "almost 200 substantive provisions" enacted "that con-
cern [the regulation of] mortgage default, servicing and foreclosure
processes. ' 258 This activity took place across 33 states and the District of
Columbia 9.25 Generally, "the adopted changes ... were largely in favor
of the borrower," involving "increases in notice periods or detailed
directions to lenders/servicers to take particular steps. ' 260 In addition,








257. See generally Immergluck et al., supra note 77.
258. Id. at i-ii.
259. See id.
260. Id. at iii.
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to a judicial process. 261
"A number of states [took] action to halt the foreclosure process for
a period [of time] to allow the opportunity for loan workouts and media-
tion. California, Colorado, Michigan, and Nevada are among [the] states
that have issued temporary delays at some point.2 62 Mediation pro-
grams have been implemented in twenty-one states, and "several more
were considering similar legislation. ' 263 "Nevada's law provides that the
borrower's election to participate in an optional mediation program can
halt foreclosure proceedings until the mediation is complete. '26 New
laws were enacted in some states that make it mandatory to give specific
notice about foreclosure assistance resources within in their states.
265
Laws enacted in states like California and Nevada provide protections
for renters in foreclosed properties. 266 "A number of states have sought
to protect distressed homeowners from foreclosure rescue
scams . "..."267
The "more substantive efforts to reduce foreclosures, including
mediation programs, have been found in judicial foreclosure states.
2 68
It was concluded that "the judicial process ...offers more time and
opportunity for incremental interventions" than non-judicial systems.2 69
Also, the "judicial process affords a borrower opportunity to [assert vari-
ous] challenge[s], and judges have "far greater latitude" to exercise their
authority and discretion "to respond to ... changes.'27° For example, in
Florida, several circuit courts implemented foreclosure programs that
may require mandatory mediation, voluntary mediation, informal negoti-
ations, or even a paper-based modification request resembling
HAMP. 27 1
261. Id. at 2 n.2.
262. Id. at 16.
263. See id. at 17.
264. Id. at 16.
265. See id. at 28 fig.7, 38-39.
266. See id. at 34, 40.
267. Id. at 16.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id. at 2.
271. See, e.g., In re Mediation - Mandatory Mediation Circuit Court Seminole Cnty. Owner-
Occupied Residential Mortg. Foreclosures, Fla. Admin. Order No. 12-25-S (July 26, 2012) (on file
with Clerk, Fla. 18th Jud. Cir.) (superseding Fla. Admin. Order 09-09-S (2009)), available at
http://www.flcourtsl8.org/ PDF/A.O.12-25-S.pdf; In re Admin. Order for Case Mgmt. of
Residential Foreclosure Cases and Mandatory Referral of Mortg. Foreclosure Cases Involving
Homestead Residences to Mediation, Fla. Admin. Order. No. 2011-06 (Aug. 12, 2011) (on file
with Clerk. Fla. 19th Jud. Cir.) (amending Fla. Admin. Order No. AO 2010-03 (2011)), available
at http://www.circuitl9.org/documents/AO/201 1/AO%202011-06%20Foreclosure.pdf; In re Case
Mgmt. of Residential Foreclosure Cases and Mandatory Referral of Mortg. Foreclosure Such
Cases to Mediation, Fla. Admin. Order No. 11-09 (July 1, 2011) (on file with Clerk, Fla. 11 th Jud.
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XI. JUDICIAL ACTIONS THAT DELAY FORECLOSURE
Throughout the United States, courts have a heightened awareness
of the interests of homeowners in foreclosure. Consequently, judges are
meticulously examining complaint allegations being filed by lenders or
servicers to ensure that they meet all state and local statutory and proce-
dural requirements. When they have fallen short, foreclosure actions
have been delayed or dismissed. For instance, the New York appellate
court in Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Weisblum, dismissed the suit,
based on Aurora's failure to strictly comply with the statutory-content
requirements in the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act (hereinafter
HEPTA) notice, a condition precedent to the commencement of the
action.272 Aurora had provided a notice, but it "did not contain the statu-
torily-required list of counseling agencies. Nor did Aurora submit an
affidavit of service to establish proper service on both borrowers 'by
registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail' to their last
known address." '273 The court determined that this "substantial failure"
to comply with the local law could not be deemed "a minor irregularity"
to be disregarded.274
The issue of who has standing to foreclose has become hotly con-
tested in courts across the country. In judicial foreclosure, a party must
establish that it has "standing" to sue the homeowner to foreclose.
Standing is an interest in the property sufficient for a court to hear a
plaintiff s claim. Generally, when a homeowner has defaulted, physical
possession of the original note is required to enforce the terms of the
loan. As a result, for both securitized and non-securitized loans, the fore-
closing party must establish standing by showing it is the holder entitled
to enforce the promissory note.275 The issue of standing has been sepa-
rately raised to challenge the chain of title on the mortgage securing the
note and the ability of the foreclosing party to prove proper transfer
under state and local laws. This raises serious problems for the securi-
tization market because of the complex chain of title issues involved and
the severe consequences if invalid. Therefore, improper transfers of the
mortgage can affect subsequent transfers of the property. Several state
court decisions involving judicial and non-judicial foreclosure proceed-
Cir.) (superseding Fla. Admin. Order No. 10-03 Al (2010)), available at http://www.judll.fl
courts.org/documents/AdministrativeOrders/I-10-03-A 1-Foreclosure%20Case%20Management
%20Referral%2OHomestead%20Residences%20to%20Mediation.pdf.
272. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
273. Victoria P. Spears, Failure to Show "Strict Compliance" with State Requirements Dooms
Mortgage Foreclosure Action, 128 THE BANKING LAW JOURNAL 657, 64-65 (2011).
274. Aurora Loan Servs., 923 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
275. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20); 3-302(e) (2011).
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ings illustrate that the legal standard being applied to determine the
"standing" issue is inconsistent across states and jurisdictions.
In a highly publicized case, U.S. Bank National Ass 'n v. Ibanez, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (a non-judicial foreclosure
state) upheld a lower court's decision to void a foreclosure sale because
the trustee for a mortgage-backed trust, U.S. Bank, could not prove that
the mortgage had been assigned to it prior to the notice of foreclosure
sale.2 76 The first assignment of the mortgage was in blank, and the trus-
tee argued that the PPM documented the assignment of the mortgage.
Noting that Massachusetts is a title theory state, the court relied on Mas-
sachusetts common law dating back to 1880 and held: "In Massachu-
setts, where a note has been assigned but there is no written assignment
of the mortgage underlying the note, the assignment of the note does not
carry with it the assignment of the mortgage." '77 However, the court's
rationale is at odds with the rule for assignments of mortgages codified
by UCC Section 9-203(g), which explicitly provides that the mortgage
automatically follows the note.278 Massachusetts adopted UCC Article 9
after the common law decision, which the court held was controlling.
Thus, under the ruling the implications could be that if a trustee does not
have sufficient documentation of assignment of the note and underlying
collateral (the mortgage), assignment of the mortgage will not be pre-
sumed, and the trustee will not be considered a holder in due course of
the underlying collateral and will be unable to foreclose. 279 The court
rejected the banks' request to apply the decision only to future foreclo-
sures saying that the ruling did not change the law.2 80 As a result, home-
owners' titles have been successfully challenged by those who lost their
property to foreclosure and by those who acquired their property after
foreclosure.aS1
276. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011).
277. Id. at 51, 53-54.
278. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(g) & cmt. 9; 9-308(e) (2011).
279. The Massachusetts court's decision was negatively received by the Permanent Editorial
Board for the UCC. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
DRAFT REPORT: UCC RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE NoTES AND TO THE
OWNERSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT OF THOSE NoTEs AND THE MORTGAGES SECURING THEM 8-9 &
n.37 (2011), available at http://extranet.ali.org/directory/files/PEBReport_onMortgage-Notes-
CirculationDraft.pdf (identifying Ibanez in a footnote and explaining the proper interpretation of
the applicable UCC rules). The Board further stated that all fifty states have adopted the rules and
that the rules preempt inconsistent principles of common law. See id. at 2 & nn.5, 8.
280. See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55. Ibanez was major decision that could affect thousands of
foreclosures that have been completed across Massachusetts. The opinion could be interpreted to
invalidate every foreclosure sale where the foreclosing party could only produce an assignment of
the mortgage dated after the date of the publication of notice but with the stated effective date of
the assignment prior to the publication date. The decision could spark challenges in other states as
well.
281. See, e.g., Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 892-93 (Mass. 2011). In Bevilacqua,
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In a recent Florida (judicial-foreclosure state) case, the appellate
court in Glarum v. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n held that a foreclosure
affidavit of indebtedness submitted by a bank employee was inadmissi-
ble hearsay because the person relied on computerized information and
did not have personal knowledge of "who, how, or when" the data was
entered, notwithstanding Florida's rules for the admission of business
records which, in part, allow a qualified witness to attest to the accuracy
of computerized records.2 82 A similar situation faces foreclosure lawyers
in New York, who must now meet a requirement, imposed in October
2010 by a New York Chief Judge, which requires the attorney of record
to personally "affirm the accuracy of their documentation" (as opposed
to the submission of an affidavit of the client representative). 283 Applied
Analytics reported that in the state of New York, it is estimated it will
take sixty-two years at the current pace for lenders to repossess on the
213,000 home loans "now in severe default or foreclosure. '"284
However, it is not only the state legislative bodies and courts adopt-
ing new requirements. The Register of Deeds in Salem, Massachusetts
now requires "the law firm and/or the lender presenting . . . documents
for recording, [to] sign a notarized affidavit, under the pains and penal-
ties of perjury, . . . certify[ing] the authenticity of ... signatures, includ-
ing the notary's," as a condition to recording.285 In addition, "the
affidavit.. . states that the signatory of the affidavit accepts full respon-
sibility, should any of the statements be incorrect which could corrupt or
cloud the homeowner's chain of title. ' 286 In a similar action, the Regis-
ter of Deeds in Greensboro, North Carolina, will not accept for filing
any documents containing a signature with the name of a known robo-
signer.2 87
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the sale of foreclosed property from a lender
whose foreclosure is invalid under Ibanez is void. See id. Therefore, the plaintiff/purchaser did not
own the property and thus lacked standing to pursue an action to quiet title. See id. at 886-87,
889, 892-93.
282. Glarum v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 83 So. 3d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (per curiam). This appears to be the first Florida case to specifically hold that an affidavit of
a loan servicer relying on computer records is inadmissible hearsay because the affidavit was
unable to identify (i) who made the data entries, (ii) how the data entries were made, or (iii) when
the data entries were made. See id. If it is interpreted in its broadest terms, Glarum, however,
could be viewed as requiring the affiant to be the actual person who entered the data into the loan
servicer's computer system.
283. See Streitfeld, Backlog, supra note 3.
284. See id.
285. Press Release, S. Essex Dist. Registry of Deeds, Mass. Register of Deeds John O'Brien is
First in the Nation to Say No to Recording Robo-Signed Documents; N.C. Register of Deeds, Jeff
Thigpen Agrees (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.salemdeeds.com/pdf/ROBOPress.pdf.
286. Id.
287. See id.; Press Release, Guilford Cnty. Register of Deeds, Mortgage Fraud Information
from Press Conference (2012), available at http://countyweb.co.guilford.nc.us/fraud-alerts.
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This line of court rulings has led to inconsistent requirements and
rules formulated by individual judges and have the potential to cause
horrific unintended consequences. This isn't necessarily a win for home-
owners. Questions can be raised whether completed negotiations that led
to modification or forbearance are valid. Will an owner of a piece of real
estate be able to confidently convey the property? Securitizations across
the country could be called into question.
XII. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR RETROACTIVE PREEMPTION
OF STATE FORECLOSURE LAW
There is Constitutional authority for federal preemption of state
foreclosure laws pursuant to the Commerce 288 and Bankruptcy
Clauses.28 9 Congress also has the power to make all laws that are "nec-
essary and proper" for carrying out these enumerated powers.29° In fact,
Congress enacted legislation in 1981 and in 1994 that authorizes a non-
judicial foreclosure process for specified loans and exempts HUD from
state foreclosure laws.291 This note proposes that Congress has authority
pursuant to the Commerce Clause to adopt a new uniform foreclosure
law, applicable to any federally-related mortgage, which specifically
preempts state foreclosure laws and procedures. This law should be
adopted as an amendment to Dodd-Frank and explicitly state that it is to
be applied retroactively to existing mortgages. Using this authority,
Congress could protect Federal financial interests and could construct a
more targeted solution for homeowners facing default than is possible
through current programs. This law would also provide an essential tool
needed for regulatory coordination to protect consumers and minimize
systemic risk to the financial system and the economy as a whole.
The U.S. Supreme Court will uphold commerce-based laws if it
finds that the activity being regulated substantially affects interstate
commerce. The Court has held that statutes regulating one of three cate-
gories of commercial activities are within congressional authority:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
288. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
289. Id. cl. 4. Such laws must be "uniform." Id. The Supreme Court has approved Congress'
use of this authority to impair contracts and even to avoid liens. See Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (citation omitted). This power provides a distinct advantage
over state foreclosure laws to overcome hurdles for loan modification programs and caused by
second liens.
290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
291. Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-17 (2006); Single
Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-68 (2006).
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interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority.includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.29 2
The last category allows courts to examine the cumulative effect of
a commercial activity on the economy as a whole. Historically, foreclo-
sure law has been left to the states, and it could be argued that an iso-
lated foreclosure of a home in a single state does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. However, a federal foreclosure law designed to
regulate the cumulative effects of a collapsing national housing market,
with billions of taxpayer dollars being paid on mortgage guarantees and
trillions more at risk, would likely fall into the category of activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. Also, it could be argued that the
new law would be part of a larger regulatory scheme under Dodd-Frank
"that could be undercut unless the intrastate [foreclosure] activity were
regulated."2 93
A federal foreclosure law may preempt state or local law in three
ways: (1) express preemption, where Congress specifically defines the
extent to which it intends to preempt state law; (2) implied or field pre-
emption, where a federal scheme so thoroughly occupies a legislative
field "as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it;" and (3) conflict preemption, where it is
impossible to follow both the federal and the state laws or when "state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. '"294 When Congress expressly states its intention
to preempt state laws, courts will uphold the preemption as long as it is
otherwise within constitutional limits.295 However, when Congress fails
to state clearly whether it intends to preempt state law, courts must
292. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
293. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561
294. US Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
295. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500-01 (2012); Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974-75 (2011). Statutes stating an intention to
preempt state laws include, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2006) (due-on-sale clauses); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7 (2006) (Congress expressly preempted state laws concerning usury); Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006) (Congress imposed national standards
concerning loan disclosures); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2006)
(requiring even state-chartered lenders to disclose information concerning the locations of
properties on which they hold a mortgage); 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (Congress expressly preempted
state constitutions and statutes in alternative mortgage instruments); Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93r (2006) (Congress authorized Board to exempt institutions from state
laws deemed to be inconsistent); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006) (Congress
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determine congressional intent or "implied preemption. '' 296
The constitutionality of the retroactive application of federal fore-
closure law would likely be challenged in judicial foreclosure states. In
such states, it could be asserted that a federal non-judicial foreclosure
process deprives a homeowner of a right to a judicial proceeding that
was guaranteed by state law at the time the mortgage was executed. The
protection of this right arises through the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The issue to be decided for
satisfaction of due process is whether "the retroactive application of a
statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by
rational means.297 Clearly, this standard is met when Congress enacts a
uniform foreclosure process to fairly deal with a crisis of the magnitude
now facing the country. Consequently, to make Congressional intent
clear, the proposed legislation should expressly preempt state and local
foreclosure-related laws and provide for retroactive application to all
federally-related mortgages.298 Additionally, the scope of the savings
clauses found in Title X of Dodd-Frank should be clarified to reflect the
preemptive intent of the federal foreclosure provisions.
XIII. PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF DODD-FRANK ACT'S
SAVINGS CLAUSES
The over 2,300 pages of the Dodd-Frank Act generate substantial
reform for many facets of the financial industry. Significantly, the Act
alters some aspects of federal preemption for laws regulating national
banks, federal thrifts, and their subsidiaries.2 99 Prior to the enactment of
Dodd-Frank, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), which regulated
federal savings and loan associations, and the Office of the Comptroller
preempted state laws thought to be discriminatory); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2011) (comptroller
promulgated rule exempting national banks from state specific state laws and regulations).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (holding that
absent explicit legislation, the test for determining whether a federal agency must comply with
state law: (1) whether the federal program requires uniform national rules; (2) whether application
of varying state laws would frustrate the federal program's objectives; and (3) whether failure to
follow state law would disrupt commercial relationships that are based on state law); cf Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (holding that federal common law governs
the dispute in the context of federal expenditure programs).
297. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
298. Id. (holding that the standard of due process under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution is whether "the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by rational means" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The constitutionality of retroactivity would likely be raised in judicial foreclosure states because it
would deprive a mortgagor of a right to a judicial proceeding that was guaranteed by state law at
the time the mortgage was executed.
299. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. X § 1044, 12 U.S.C. § 25b (Supp. IV 2011); Dodd-Frank Act
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection tit. X § 1046, 12 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. IV 2011).
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of the Currency ("OCC"), which regulates national banks, had compre-
hensively exempted federally chartered lenders from a wide range of
state laws.3" In 2004, the OCC promulgated regulations that extended
the exemptions to state-chartered subsidiaries of federal banks. In 2007,
the Supreme Court, in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., upheld the OCC
exemptions. 30 1 Wachovia argued that its state-chartered subsidiary,
Wachovia Mortgage, was not subject to certain state laws that were
designed to prevent mortgage lending abuses.3 °2 The Court agreed, and
reasoned that, because national banks have authority to make mortgage
loans, state law does not apply whether the national bank or its state-
chartered subsidiary makes the loans.30 3
The Dodd-Frank Act rolls back the scope of federal preemption of
state consumer protection laws for national banks that existed following
Watters.3° Specifically, Title X of the Act creates a new regulator, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with broad rulemaking and
enforcement authority and the mandate to prevent "abusive" financial
practices.30 5 Within Title X, Subtitle D "Preservation of State Law," sec-
tion 1044 provides limited criteria under which "state consumer finan-
cial laws" may be preempted under the Act.306 It provides that state law
is not preempted unless the state law discriminates against national
banks or federal thrifts, "prevents or significantly interferes" with the
institution's ability to do business, or is expressly preempted by federal
law.3 °7 In effect, the Act adopts the Supreme Court's standard in Barnett
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.3 °8 Section 1044 provides that
300. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2011); Id. § 560.2(a), (b).
301. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20-22 (2007).
302. See id. at 9-10. The laws at issue involved the state's "visitorial power," which was
defined as: "'(i) [e]xamination of a bank; (ii) [i]nspection of a bank's books and records; (iii)
[riegulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law;
and (iv) [e]nforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those
activities."' Id. at 14 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2) (2006)).
303. See Watters, 550 U.S. at 21-22.
304. See id. (recognizing the constitutionality of the broad preemptive scope of the National
Banking Act and stating that "[r]egulation of national bank operations is a prerogative of Congress
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses"). The Court's decision is unaffected by
the subsequent enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and its savings clause.
305. Dodd-Frank Act tit. X § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2011) (establishing the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection); id. § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (Supp. IV 2011) (outlining the
Bureau's rulemaking authority); id. § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (Supp. IV 2011) (stating that the
Bureau should take action to prevent "unfair, deceptive, or abusive" financial practices).
306. Dodd-Frank Act tit. X § 1044, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing three bases
under which federal law may preempt a "state consumer financial law": (1) the state law
discriminates against national banks, "in comparison with the effect of the state law on a bank
chartered by that State"; (2) the state law "prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by
the national bank of its powers"; or (3) the state law is preempted by some other federal law).
307. Id.
308. See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 28 (1996) (invalidating a
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Title X of the Act "does not occupy the field" of any area of State law
for purposes of a court's determination of conflict preemption of state
law.
30 9
Thereafter, Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act-the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act-prohibits or restricts certain
mortgage lending practices, limits a lender's ability to compensate loan
officers and brokers, and imposes new mandatory underwriting and ser-
vicing standards. 310 Title XIV codifies the concept of the borrower's
reasonable ability to repay a home loan as a key factor in loan origina-
tion.311 Section 1413 gives borrowers the right to defend against a judi-
cial or non-judicial foreclosure or any other action to collect the debt, by
asserting that the creditor violated the anti-steering and the ability-to-
repay provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.312 Lenders are afforded a
rebuttable presumption if they can show that a loan is a "qualified mort-
gage"313 as defined in the act. 314 Broader objectives of mortgage reform
are also extensively addressed in Title XIV.
In particular, Subtitle G, "Mortgage Resolution and Modification"
directs the HUD Secretary to develop a program to "facilitate[e] the
transfer of [at-risk multifamily] properties ... to responsible new own-
ers." '315 Similarly, section 1406 mandates a HUD study "to determine
prudent statutory and regulatory" rules "for the widespread use of shared
appreciation mortgages" as a form of mortgage modification. 316 In sec-
tion 1491, the Act lists extensive Congressional "Findings" related to
GSEs and their dominant role in the U.S. mortgage market, in terms of
total dollar and market share.317 Subtitle G details how, over time, the
"mandated affordable housing goals" set by HUD for the GSEs changed,
resulting in an increasingly larger percentage of their portfolios being
state insurance law that prohibited national banks from selling insurance in small towns in Florida
as preempted by a federal law).
309. Dodd-Frank Act it. X § 1044, 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(4) (Supp. IV 2011).
310. Dodd-Frank Act tit. XIV §§ 1403, 1411, 1414, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639b-c (Supp. IV 2011).
311. Dodd-Frank Act tit. XIV § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (Supp. IV'2011) (in determining a
consumer's ability to repay the loan, the consumer's credit history, current and expected income,
expenses, debt-to-income ratio, and employment will be considered).
312. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. XIV § 1413, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. IV 2011).
313. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. XIV § 1412, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (Supp. IV 2011) (providing a
lengthy definition of a qualified mortgage with parameters for verification of borrower's financial
resources, permissible points and fees, debt to income ratios, and other regulations to be
established).
314. Id. ("Any creditor with respect to any residential mortgage loan, and any assignee of such
loan subject to liability under this title, may presume that the loan has met the requirements ... if
the loan is a qualified mortgage.").
315. Dodd-Frank Act tit. XIV § 1481, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5220b (Supp. IV 2011).
316. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1406, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010).
317. See § 1491, 124 Stat. at 2205-06.
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composed of subprime mortgage securities.318 Section 1491(b) provides
the "sense of the Congress that efforts to enhance .. practices related to
[mortgage] credit would be incomplete without reforms" to the GSEs.
31 9
Thereafter, section 1492 mandates that studies and reports be made
relating to loan modification, mortgage foreclosure fraud, and educa-
tion.320 In addition, the Title mandates reporting of mortgage data321' and
increases funding for emergency mortgage relief,322 legal aid for fore-
closure-related issues313 and for the "Neighborhood Stabilization Pro-
gram. 324 Significantly, unlike Title X, there are no provisions in Title
XIV that broadly limit its preemptive effect on state laws.32 5 By request-
ing recommendations upon completion of the foreclosure-related stud-
ies, Congress signals it may enact further measures, as warranted.
XIV. CLEAR NEED FOR FEDERAL FoRECLOsuRE ACT
Collectively, the findings of the many studies discussed above pro-
vide valuable information for policymakers to now consider as this fore-
closure crisis continues to evolve. Many borrowers are now employing a
cost-benefit analysis to decide their course of action. Borrowers with
knowledge about the length to foreclose may have an incentive to use
defensive tactics to delay foreclosure for an extended period of time,
extracting substantial rent-free benefits from the mortgage lender. 26
More importantly, policies that increase a borrower's incentive to
default will, in fact, produce more mortgage defaults. With strategic
defaults on the rise, there have emerged "strategic default" consulting
firms, law firms, and websites offering advice and information.3 27 While
there may not be a causal connection, the November 15, 2011, S&P
Indices show that first mortgage default rates for October rose for the
second consecutive month from 1.99% in September to 2.08%.328
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See id. § 1492, 124 Stat. at 2206.
321. Id. § 1493, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-25 (Supp. IV 2011).
322. Id. § 1496, 124 Stat. at 2207-08.
323. Id. § 1498, 12 U.S.C. § 1701x-2 (Supp. IV 2011).
324. Id. § 1497, 124 Stat. at 2209-10.
325. Compare id. tit. XIV § 1400(b), 124 Stat. at 2136 (designating subtitles A, B, C, D, and
§§ 1471-72, 1475-76 as being subject to the "savings" provisions of Title X), with id. tit. X
§ 1063, 12 U.S.C. § 5583 (Supp. IV 2011) (savings provision of Title X).
326. See Zhu & Pace, supra note 5, at 1-3.
327. See, e.g., Learn How to Strategically Default at StrategicDefault.org, THE STRATEcIC
DEFAULT MoNITOR (last visited May 30, 2012), http://www.strategicdefault.org; see also Les
Christie, Walk Away From Your Mortgage? Time to Get 'Ruthless', CNN MoNEY (June 7, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/07/real-estate/walk-away-mortgage/index.htm (discussing various
instances of strategic defaults).
328. Maureen Maitland, Second Consecutive Increase in First Mortgage Default Rates,
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Clearly, the financial crisis could become much worse if all 10.9 million
underwater homeowners decide to default on their mortgages.
Delays in the foreclosure process that are caused by the well-
intended intercession of many state and local activists will delay eco-
nomic recovery and the resolution of this crisis. These delays have cre-
ated uncertainty regarding the value of the mortgage assets held by
financial institutions. Until the bottom of the housing market is reached
and a consistent and reliable upward trajectory in housing prices is
established, new housing construction will not proceed. 2 9 By injecting
uncertainty as to when the housing market will bottom-out, foreclosure
delays undermine the incentives of construction and development com-
panies to invest.330 This postponed investment lowers economic activity
and further weakens the economic recovery.
33 1
In the 1990s, Japan experienced a sharp drop in real estate prices
that caused their financial system to be plagued with bad loans.3 32 Japa-
nese banks and politicians failed to deal with the problem causing the
Japanese economy to suffer over a decade of slow economic growth.3 33
At the time, Japanese policymakers argued that a policy of forbearance
was essential to prevent a damaging real estate price crash. Japanese
banks were often more supportive of problem borrowers than borrowers
who were more creditworthy. 334 This policy also allowed Japanese
HouSINGVEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.housingviews.com/2011/11/18/second-consecutive-
increase-in-first-mortgage-default-rates.
329. See Dixie M. Blackley, The Long-Run Elasticity of New Housing Supply in the United
States: Empirical Evidence for 1950 to 1994, 18 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 25, 37-38 (1999)
(discussing the price elasticity of new housing supply); Christopher J. Mayer & C. Tsuriel
Somerville, Residential Construction: Using the Urban Growth Model to Estimate Housing
Supply, 48 J. URB. ECON., 85, 86-87, 105 (2000).
330. See Ben S. Bernanke, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment, 98 Q.J. EcoN.
85, 92-93 (1983) (now-Board-of-Govemors-of-the-Federal-Reserve-Chairman Bernanke
proposing that a temporary increase in uncertainty can cause a sudden drop in investment
spending and that even a single unusual event can make investors less certain about the nature of
the market, and thus cause them to adjust their behavior toward a higher degree of caution).
331. See Ali Anari, James Kolari & Joseph Mason, Bank Asset Liquidation and the
Propagation of the U.S. Great Depression, 37 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 753, 760-61
(2005); Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 257, 264 (1983).
332. See Steve Lohr, From Japan's Slump in 1990s, Lessons for U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/business/worldbusiness/09japan.htl?pagewanted= I
&r=l1 &ei=5088&en=aOd4dac3e35e299a&ex=1360299600&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
333. See id.; Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos.,
Speech at the Institute of International Bankers Annual Washington Conference: Addressing the
Credit Crisis and Restructuring the Financial Regulatory System: Lessons from Japan 3 (Mar. 2,
2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2009/030209.pdf.
334. See JIM SAXTON, JoINT EcoN. CoMM., RESEARCH REPORT No. 110-30, POLICY LESSONS
FROM JAPAN'S LOST DECADE 2 (2008), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/
?a=Files.Serve&Fileid=9cbc8e9b-8277-44c8-b962-4bc Ida97f158.
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banks to avoid recognizing their losses.3 35 While forbearing avoided a
sharp nose dive in prices, it also created a climate of restrictive lending
and ingrained cynicism where investors knew that prices were being
artificially propped up.3 3 6 There was a lingering suspicion that prices
might fall in the future if (or when) more bad news emerged. A similar
mindset seems to have now taken hold in the U.S., where everyday indi-
viduals are just waiting for the other shoe to drop. "Ironically, during
that period, American policymakers repeatedly urged the Japanese to
remove this unease, by recognising [sic] the bad loans and introducing
measures to establish "clearing prices[.]" '337 Perhaps it is now time for
the U.S. to heed its own advice.
This note suggests that a federal streamlined foreclosure process is
critically needed and should be enacted with explicit language of Con-
gressional intent to preempt state foreclosure-related laws. It should also
define controlling law and thus provide a level playing field to achieve
federal goals and assure consistent, predictable and fair mitigation and
foreclosure process.
XV. PROPOSED FEDERAL FORECLOSURE ACT
The proposed Act would provide for a final non-judicial foreclo-
sure process for all single-family "federally related mortgage loans" as
that term is defined under Title 12 of United States Code.338 The Act
would expressly preempt all state foreclosure laws and would be applied
retroactively to all "federally related mortgage loans," including such
mortgage loans that are the subject of any pending state foreclosure
proceedings.
The act should be proposed as an amendment to the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-predatory Lending Act, Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank
Act. The Secretary of HUD, in consultation with the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), shall establish a single set of uniform regulations controlling
foreclosure procedures, including provisions for notice and fair hearing.
The Secretary of HUD will appoint a foreclosure commissioner for the
purpose of administering the foreclosure proceedings.




337. Gillian Tett, Housing market gridlock must be swiftly resolved, FT.com (Nov. 4, 2010,
5:09 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b371020-e834-11df-8995-00144feab49a.html#axzz2A5hj
pC8F.
338. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (2006) (defining
"federally related mortgage loan").
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1.) Default and Notice of Default: A borrower's failure to pay the
full amount of the payment due on the date it is due or a borrower's
breach of any agreement set forth in the security agreement shall consti-
tute a default. If payment is not received or the breach cured within 30
days of the default, a creditor may send a Notice of Default. Such notice
would be given by personal delivery or by first class mail (sent to the
last known address of record) to parties having an interest in the prop-
erty subject to the mortgage being foreclosed, including:339 owner, mort-
gagor, junior lien holders, parties who are in possession of the property
(such as residential tenants), parties holding easement or servitude rights
(such as home associations), parties with non-possessory interests in the
property, persons claiming an interest in the property under a statutory
lien or encumbrance created subsequent to the recording or filing of the
mortgage being foreclosed. The notice would contain relevant informa-
tion including: contact information of foreclosure the commissioner; the
original mortgagee; the original mortgagor; street address or a descrip-
tion of the property sufficient to identify the property to be sold; details
of default and action that must be taken to cure the default, including
amount unpaid; information regarding hearing rights and rights to cure;
and the date, time, and location of the foreclosure sale. A copy of the
notice would also be published four consecutive weeks in a newspaper
accepted as a newspaper of legal record in the county where the property
being sold is located.
2.) Right to Cure: There will be a right to cure the default prior to
the foreclosure sale. The borrower will be entitled to a forty-five (45)
day period from the mailing of the Notice of Default to cure the default
by taking the action to cure the default as set forth in the Notice, includ-
ing paying all delinquent amounts, accumulated interest, late payment
charges, plus reasonable costs and attorney fees actually incurred by the
creditor. If the borrower fails to cure in the time allowed, the creditor
may accelerate the entire indebtedness. The foreclosure process will ter-
minate at any time prior to the actual sale if the default has been cured.
3.) Right to a Hearing: There would be a provision for a pre-fore-
closure hearing prior to the foreclosure sale sufficient to satisfy Due Pro-
cess. Defenses available under § 1413 of Title X of Dodd-Frank may be
raised in the hearing at such time as provided under the regulations to be
written. Such hearing will be available to all parties entitled to notice,
such as subordinate lien holders. The commissioner will make a deter-
mination of the fact of default and whether it is lawful, under the appli-
339. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983) (holding that
mortgagees have "property interest" warranting Due Process Clause notice in tax foreclosure
sales).
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cable contract terms, to proceed with foreclosure. The commissioner
will determine whether a default exists at the time of the hearing so that
the commissioner is justified in proceeding to foreclose. If no default is
found, then clearly there is no basis for foreclosure.
4.) Date and Manner of Sale: The foreclosure sale would be held at
public auction at a date, time and location as specified in the notice of
default. Such date must be at least ninety (90) days after mortgagor
received the Notice of Default to be established by the date on the proof
of delivery. Regulations should attempt to include advertising methods
to promote wider participation to increase value through competitive
bidding. The Act would provide that the foreclosure sale price is conclu-
sively deemed "fair market value" and makes the foreclosure purchaser
a bona fide purchaser.
340
5.) Proceeds of Sale: The foreclosure commissioner would pay the
costs of foreclosure, tax liens, preservation of property costs (such as
insurance and assessments), the principal, interest and charges of the
mortgage being foreclosed. Any surplus proceeds of the sale would be
paid first to holders of liens recorded after the mortgage in the order of
priority under Federal law or the law of the State in which the security
property is located with interest any balance paid to the defaulting
homeowner.
6.) Right of Redemption: There shall be no right of redemption, or
right of possession based upon a right of redemption, after the foreclo-
sure sale has been completed.
7.) Deficiency Judgment: The mortgagee shall have no right to pur-
sue or execute a deficiency judgment for the satisfaction of the indebted-
ness of the mortgagor that has not been satisfied by the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale.
8.) Effect of the Sale: To assure certainty of title following the fore-
closure sale, the Act would provide that a sale, conducted as prescribed,
would bar all claims to the property sold for each entity to whom the
notice of default and foreclosure sale was mailed and their heirs, those
with actual knowledge of sale, and those claiming any interest in the
property whose basis for claimed interest (i.e. assignment, mortgage)
was not recorded in the proper place for recording or filing before the
date on which the notice of the foreclosure sale was published.
This proposal is intended to provide sufficient notice and hearing
rights to prevent causing any doubt as to validity of title passed under
the statute based upon failure to satisfy constitutional requirements.
340. Cf. Sensenich v. Molleur (In re Chase), 328 B.R. 675 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2005) (holding that a
provision designating "fair market value" price avoids potential challenges that the sale was a
fraudulent conveyance under bankruptcy laws).
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HUD has over twenty-five years of experience executing the pre-fore-
closure procedures currently in place under the "Single Family Mort-
gage Foreclosure Act of 1994." The regulations adopted to implement
the 1994 Act are elaborate and lengthy. With such experience, there
should be few difficulties encountered in crafting new regulations for the
proposed Act that satisfy constitutional requirements.
XVI. POST FORECLOSURE DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
"An estimated 1 million or more properties will likely pass through
REO inventory in 2011, with another million or so per year expected in
both 2012 and 2013." 3 1' Recognizing the growing problem, the FHFA,
along with the Treasury Department and HUD, issued an open request to
all interested parties for submission of ideas or other strategies to
improve the REO asset disposition programs of Fannie, Freddie, and the
FHA in August 2011.342 The objectives to be achieved included:
reduce the REO portfolios of the Enterprises and FHA in a cost-
effective manner; reduce average loan loss severities to the Enter-
prises and FHA relative to individual distressed property sales;
address property repair and rehabilitation needs; respond to economic
and real estate conditions in specific geographies; assist in neighbor-
hood and home price stabilization efforts; and suggest analytic
approaches to determine the appropriate disposition strategy for indi-
vidual properties, whether sale, rental or, in certain instances,
demolition.343
However, the FHFA request indicated that the agencies "anticipate
respondents may best address these objectives through REO to rental
structures. ' 34
In order to establish the market bottom, a large inventory of REO
properties must be liquidated. The creation of REO to rental program
would only install another version of the many government strategies
designed to artificially maintain house prices. It would delay housing
stock from entering the market thereby creating a "shadow market"
which will prolong the uncertainty that is already plaguing the market.
Instead, what the housing market needs is certainty, which will stimulate
investment and consumption and spur economic growth. The stated
341. Remarks by Elizabeth A. Duke, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, at the Federal Reserve Board Policy Forum: "The Housing Market Going Forward:
Lessons Learned from the Recent Crisis," (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/duke20110901a.pdf.
342. See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY ET AL., REQUEST FOR INFORMATION: ENTERPRISEIFHA REO
ASSET DISPOSrTON 1-2 (2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/08
1011_reo rfi.pdf.
343. Id. at 1-2.
344. Id. at 2.
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objectives outlined by the agencies can be met by adapting and employ-
ing innovative liquidation strategies as was done by the RTC during the
savings and loan crisis of the 1990s.
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the enactment of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA") constituted the most significant restructuring of federal
banking regulatory agencies since the 1930s.345 Congress passed FIR-
REA in an effort to handle the crisis in the savings and loan industry and
to prevent another financial crisis.3 46 The Act created a new agency, the
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), whose function was to manage
all failing banks where a conservator or receiver had been appointed, as
well as to manage and liquidate assets in the Federal Asset Disposition
Association.347
Although facing a new financial crisis, the objectives that the
FHFA hopes to achieve are similar to those sought by the RTC.34 8 Many
observers heralded the RTC as a great success.34 9 In its six years of
existence, the RTC resolved 747 insolvent thrifts and recovered $395
billion of the $456 billion in its charge.350 The taxpayers' burden for the
clean-up was just under $150 billion, an amount far less than many
experts had predicted.35 1 After only three years, the agency sold over
$450 billion of real estate assets at an outstanding 86% of book value. 2
Many of the assets were difficult to dispose of, yet the RTC was able to
succeed by employing many innovative strategies including bulk sales,
auctions, and mortgage securitizations and shared equity ventures.353
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CORPORATION: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1-3 (2008) (discussing the passage of the FIRREA).
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The successful disposition of REO inventory arising out of the cur-
rent crisis will require a range of innovative solutions. The sheer volume
of homes to contend with may be daunting. RealtyTrac reported in Janu-
ary 2012 that almost 1.9 million homes received about 2.7 foreclosure
filings in 2011 and that it expects foreclosure activity for 2012 to be
"higher than it was in 201 1."' There have been estimates that there
may be another seven million homes that will face foreclosure in the
next several years.355 The large volume of REO homes will be dispersed
throughout the nation in concentrations that will vary and as a result,
there will be logistical problems to overcome. There are many firms in
the U.S. that have the current capability to use sophisticated analytical
software to develop multiple options for the disposition of properties
over time as new REOs enter the pool.
Unfortunately, unless credit is made more readily available across
the spectrum of potential purchasers, these homes may end up exclu-
sively in the hands of investors with access to private equity. Credit
availability for first-time homebuyers, owner-occupied buyers, and
small local investors is limited. Proposed regulations under Dodd-Frank
regarding the Qualified Residential Mortgage and the Qualified Mort-
gage may further tighten available credit. To alleviate the credit crunch,
short-term modifications to current agency programs could provide nec-
essary backing to facilitate market-rate financing to purchase and/or
rehab homes. In addition, the Fannie and Freddie restrictions limiting
the number of individual homes that can be purchased by a small inves-
tor should be raised or eliminated for investors who can demonstrate a
successful track record in managing multiple properties. In order to
achieve the intended purpose of removing REO property from available
housing inventory, the sale of any property in bulk should contain
in large, bulk-sale packages with a mix of nonperforming mortgages and REO properties to attract
institutional investors; sold assets at auctions, where the RTC contracts with professionals to
market and manage the disposal of particular portfolio which allowed presenting a large number
of assets to the market, while minimizing overhead costs; disposed assets through securitization,
structure of each securitization transaction depended on the nature of the underlying asset, and
addressed investor pessimism as to value of real estate assets by developing its own securitization
model for mortgage backed securities known as Ritzy Maes. Substantial information about the
risks of the underlying mortgages was disclosed and significant credit enhancement techniques
were used (usually in the form of reserve funds) such that the RTC was able to attract investors.
To dispose of some assets the RTC had to provide seller financing. In structuring some of these
deals, the RTC would retain an equity stake so that the RTC would get a share of the up-side
potential of the assets being sold. The RTC showed a great deal of flexibility in working with
investors and so, overall, the RTC's resolution of the insolvent thrifts was considered a successful
process by many.
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enforceable restrictions on the resale of any included properties for a
minimum of three years. This would encourage making homes available
for rent by those families that have been displaced by foreclosure and
would help to stabilize neighborhoods.
The use of public auctions, conducted utilizing a well-developed
computer platform, could provide valuable tools to meet changing port-
folio needs. Properties could be sold individually or in bulk as needed to
achieve the best price. These auctions can also be nationally and locally
advertised to attract more bidders and auctioned by state or region.
Information regarding possible financing could be made available in
print and on the auction web site. Bidders could be pre-qualified to
assure certainty of execution of the purchase. Finally, any process used
to dispose of REO property must include safeguards against fraud, pro-
vide for transparency, and be open to all interested and qualified buyers.
XVII. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that there is a clear need for an efficient,
national uniform foreclosure procedure. State actions related to foreclo-
sures are causing uncertainty in the rule of law, contract enforcement,
and basic property rights. Perhaps the ultimate issue facing policy-mak-
ers is how to ensure the stable and efficient functioning of financial and
economic markets to promote the general well-being of the country
while protecting the interests of the individual without creating moral
hazard. By balancing the interests of creditors and borrowers, a federal
uniform foreclosure law will ensure fairness and return certainty to the
foreclosure process, which, in turn, will bring vitality to the U.S. hous-
ing market and propel economic recovery.
2012]
